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ABSTRACT
Much of the extant research on jury decision making has been conducted at the juror
level, examining the individual decisions of mock jurors. Although studying mock juror
decisions provides initial insight into jury decision making, studying the deliberation process
should be a priority for future research. Few theoretical models have been developed to examine
the decision process of the jury. The social combination and the social communication
approaches provide some insight into this process; however, analysis of these methods is scarce
due, in part, to their limited applicability.
The current study examined the jury deliberation using a combined theoretical approach.
Participants were 216 undergraduate students from the University of Texas at El Paso,
participating in 37 mock juries. Results indicate that the group’s final decision most often
reflects the preference of the initial majority. The evidence discussed during the deliberation did
not vary by the distribution of pre-deliberation individual verdict preferences. Individual jurors’
participation in the deliberation differed according to the initial distribution of verdicts. The
majority faction as a whole participated more in the deliberation; however, individual jurors in
the minority faction actually participated more in the deliberation than individual jurors in the
majority faction. Individuals who changed their verdict preference during the deliberation did not
differ from non-changers in participation in the jury-level model, but these individuals expressed
less confidence in the final group decision.
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

The empirical study of jury decision making began with the ground-breaking work of the
Chicago Jury Project (James, 1959; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Strodtbeck, James, & Hawkins,
1957). In the 50 years following, psycholegal researchers have continued to study the decision
making processes of the jury extensively (for reviews, see Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, &
Pryce, 2001; Ellsworth & Mauro, 1998; Levett, Danielsen, Kovera, & Cutler, 2005; Vidmar &
Hans, 2007). Much of the extant research has been conducted at the juror level; that is, these
studies have examined the individual decisions of mock jurors. Fewer studies have been
conducted to examine decision making at the jury level (for a review, see Devine et al., 2001).
Studying individual mock jurors’ decision making processes has provided valuable insight
regarding individuals’ assessments of trial evidence (e.g., Martire & Kemp, 2009), understanding
of judge’s instructions (e.g., Martire & Kemp, 2009; Semmler & Brewer, 2002), and perceptions
of courtroom players (e.g., Bottoms, Davis, & Epstein, 2004; Hahn & Clayton, 1996; Narby,
Cutler, & Moran, 1993). This line of research has contributed greatly to the field and has
provided a firm foundation for future studies on jury-level decision making.
However, understanding how individual juror-level decisions are combined into a single
group decision is not as simple as viewing jury-level decision making as the sum of its parts
(Foss, 1976). Decades of research have suggested that groups can reach fairer, less biased
decisions than individuals reach alone (Baron & Kerr, 2003; Kaplan & Miller, 1978; Kerwin &
Shaffer, 1994; Lorge, Fox, Davitz, & Brenner, 1958; Michaelsen, Watson, & Black, 1989),
especially when the task demands specific goals (Brehm, Kassin, & Fein, 2005; Kerr & Tindale,
2004; Locke & Latham, 2002). An underlying premise of the jury is that individual biases
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influence individual verdicts to a much greater extent than group verdicts. The jury deliberation
process may lessen the effects of individual jurors’ personal biases by shifting attention to the
entire body of evidence, which all the jurors have in common (Kaplan & Miller, 1978). Thus,
research suggests that, although studying mock-juror decisions provides initial insight into jury
decision making, studying the deliberation process should be a priority for future research.
1.1

Research on Jury Decision Making

1.1.1

The American Jury
It is estimated that more than 100,000 jury trials occur each year in the United States

(Devine et al., 2001; Mize, Hannaford-Agor, & Waters, 2007; Saks & Marti, 1997; Vidmar &
Hans, 2007). The vast majority (approximately 85-90%) of these cases end in conviction (Bureau
of Justice Statistics, 2006). Although the petit jury is often criticized (Penrod & Heuer, 1998;
Vidmar & Hans, 2007), the jury process is still considered a cornerstone of democracy
(Abramson, 1994; Vidmar & Hans, 2007) and is emulated in countries around the world (Vidmar
& Hans, 2007).
The American jury is made up of a group of individuals who have no prior connection,
no formal training, and no expertise in the area of the case. Yet these individuals are faced with
the awesome responsibility of deciphering the “truth.” This search may involve complex case
files, competing stories, and incomplete facts. Despite all the challenges facing the jury, these
individuals are able to work through their differences to reach a group verdict that matches that
of an expert (i.e., the judge) over 75% of the time (Eisenberg, Hannaford-Agor, Hans, Waters,
Munsterman, Schwab, & Wells, 2005; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Vidmar & Hans, 2007).
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1.1.2

Juror Decision Making
To date, more research has been conducted on theoretical models to assess the individual-

level decision making of jurors than to understand the group-level decision making of juries.
Starting in the middle of the 20th century, models such as the sequential weighting model (Weld
& Danzig, 1940; Weld & Roff, 1938) were developed to predict individual jurors’ decisions.
Since that time, information integration models (Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974), Bayesian models
(Marshall & Wise, 1975), Poisson models (Davis, 1973; Kerr, 1978), and the story model
(Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983a; Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1993) have all
been developed to examine juror-level decision making. Each of these models has clear benefits
and limitations. These models have provided useful insight into individual mock jurors’
approaches to decision making; however, these models cannot be fully extrapolated to
understand the group verdict.
1.1.3

Jury Decision Making
Challenges to studying the jury decision making process have long been recognized.

Since the time of Kalven and Zeisel’s study (1966), researchers have been forced to work around
the limitations of studying the deliberation. Because gathering a group of 12 individuals with no
prior connection is a primary challenge, many researchers have begun to study deliberations in
smaller groups. Although the jury traditionally includes 12 members, some states have allowed
the use of smaller groups of jurors. In fact, this practice has gained increased acceptance in the
legal system (e.g., Birkett v. Dockery, 2009). In Williams v. Florida (1970), the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that using juries with fewer than 12 members did not violate defendants’ rights. The
Court noted, that “no discernible evidence” suggested that juries of six members differed
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significantly from juries of 12 members. Subsequent empirical studies, summarized in a metaanalysis by Saks and Marti (1997), found few differences in outcomes due to group size. This
analysis of 17 empirical studies that compared six-person and 12-person deliberating juries found
that the 12-person juries took longer to deliberate and recalled more trial testimony. Six-person
juries tended to include greater participation by group members. However, most importantly, the
groups did not differ in their likelihood to reach the “correct” verdict, as determined by the
majority of individuals in the population. Because there is no strong empirical evidence to
suggest that groups of six or 12 mock jurors reach significantly different verdicts (Davis, Kerr,
Atkin, Holt, & Meek, 1975; Devine et al., 2001; Saks & Marti, 1997), researchers have
continued to study groups of fewer than 12 mock jurors. Although the utility of using six-person
juries in mock jury research is widely recognized, most researchers strongly recommend that the
tradition of 12 jurors continue to be upheld in the courts (Miller & Kazmar, 2007; Smith & Saks,
2008; Zeisel & Diamond, 1974).
In addition to the practical challenges inherent in organizing and analyzing a group
deliberation, limited theoretical work has been conducted at the jury level. In fact, in amassing a
comprehensive review of jury-level empirical work, Devine et al. (2001) indicated that this
overview of the empirical work on deliberating juries emerged due to the absence of an
“overarching theoretical model” to organize the body of work (p. 625). In that review, Devine et
al. (2001) identified 206 empirical studies published between 1955 and 1999 that examined
deliberating groups. In the majority of these studies (66%), mock jurors deliberated on simulated
trial material. This method provides the researcher with more control over extraneous variables
and the opportunity to monitor the deliberations; however, this method is limited in its external
validity (Diamond, 1997; Saks, 1997).
4

Four major categories of study emerged from the Devine et al. (2001) review: procedural
characteristics, participant characteristics, case characteristics, and deliberation characteristics.
Procedural characteristics, such as jury size and jury instructions, are “institutional parameters
related to jury functioning” (Devine et al., 2001, p. 625). Participant characteristics relate to
individual difference variables. These factors include demographic variables, personality traits,
attitudes, and the characteristics of trial participants. Case characteristics include factors specific
to trials. One of the most studied characteristics, strength of evidence against the defendant, has
been shown to be one of the strongest predictors of final verdict, typically explaining the
majority of the variation in verdict preferences (Devine et al., 2001; Taylor & Hosch, 2004;
Saks, 1976; Visher, 1987).
Limited work has been devoted to understanding the last category discussed by Devine et
al. (2001) – deliberation characteristics. Deliberation characteristics include patterns of initial
verdict preferences, juror interaction, discussion content, and deliberation structure. Devine et al.
(2001) suggested that the limited interest in conducting research on the deliberation process may
stem from Kalven and Zeisel’s “majority rules” finding – the verdict preferred by the majority of
individuals at the start of the deliberation is the preferred final verdict approximately nine out of
ten times. Subsequent studies have found support for this assertion (Baron & Kerr, 2003; Stasser,
Kerr, & Bray, 1982; Tindale & Davis, 1983). Devine et al. (2001) indicated that, in
approximately one out of ten trials, minority factions overcome the initial group preference and
offered factors that may explain the 10% of trials in which the minority prevails. Deliberation
style (evidence-driven vs. verdict-driven), polling mechanics, strength of evidence, and
interpretation of jury instructions were all seen as potential areas in which the minority could
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influence the majority. More insight on the impact of the minority faction can be gleaned by
examining literature on small group decision making.
1.1.4

Minority Influence Research
Classic social psychological research examining minority factions offers theoretical

insight into this 10% of cases. Moscovici and colleagues (Kozakai, Moscovici, & Personnaz,
1994; Moscovici, 1980; Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972; Moscovici & Lage, 1976) recognized that
minority factions must have some influence on the greater majority or change would never
happen (Moscovici, 1980). The minority faction may not possess the power or the greater
number of members that the majority faction enjoys by definition, but small factions often
possess courage, ingenuity, and, most necessarily, a willingness to disagree with the majority.
These are the qualities that allow the minority to express their divergent views (Moscovici,
1980).
A meta-analysis of 97 minority-influence studies (Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme,
& Blackstone, 1994) found that, consistent with Moscovici’s hypotheses, majority factions are
generally more effective than minority factions in convincing opposing group members to
change their opinion. Similarly, Trost, Maass, and Kenrick (1992) found that majority factions
were more persuasive than minority factions when the target group initially opposed the
viewpoint offered by the other group. Specifically, Trost and colleagues indicated that
individuals who oppose the opinion of the minority faction may feel more confident in rejecting
the point of view brought forward by the smaller and less powerful minority faction than the
larger and more powerful majority faction.
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Clark and Maass (1990) found that the potential for the minority to influence the decision
of the majority decreases as the size of the majority increases. Baron and Kerr (2003) concluded
that minority influence is most effective when the minority faction includes more than one
individual and holds its position consistently over time. Put in the context of the jury, a minority
faction can overcome its initial disadvantage and shift the group verdict. Like Henry Fonda’s
character in the classic film Twelve Angry Men¸ a minority faction that consistently and firmly
holds its position throughout the deliberation can persuade other group members to alter their
initial outlooks (Fonda, Rose, Justin, & Lumet, 1957).
1.1.5

Verdict Change
What, then, are the factors that can lead individual jurors to change from their initial

verdict preferences? Little research has been conducted to examine verdict change in the
deliberation. A handful of studies (e.g., Foley & Pigott, 1997; Rotenberg, Hewlett, & Siegwart,
1998; Strodtbeck et al., 1957) have examined which jurors appear to be more influential during
the deliberation, but no research has specifically examined which jurors are more likely to yield
to the group. The findings of the persuasion literature can be applied to the jury context to
facilitate the examination of hypotheses about why jurors may change their verdicts and which
jurors may be more susceptible to persuasion. Based on this literature, the characteristics of the
communicator, the verdict changer, and the context could be considered when studying verdict
change during the deliberation.
First, the characteristics of the communicator (i.e., jurors representing a viewpoint
opposing that of the changer) could be examined. In the jury context, studies have shown that
male jurors (Cornwell & Hans, 2011; Marcus, Lyons, & Guyton, 2000; Strodtbeck et al., 1957),
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educated jurors (Cornwell & Hans, 2011; Hastie et al., 1983a; Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington,
1983b), tall jurors (Marcus et al., 2000), and individuals high in need for cognition (Shestowsky
& Horowitz, 2004) are perceived as more influential and knowledgeable during the deliberation.
The perceived credibility of the communicator can influence attitude change and behavioral
compliance. Individuals perceived as having high credibility are more persuasive in changing
attitudes or gaining behavioral compliance than individuals perceived as having low credibility
(Pornpitakpan, 2004).
The characteristics of the changer could also be explored. Attitude-behavior consistency
has been found to be related to an individual’s confidence in their preexisting attitude (Kraus,
1995; Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997). An individual confident in a preexisting belief (e.g., an
individual verdict of not guilty) is more likely to behave in a manner consistent with that attitude
(e.g., support a group verdict of not guilty) and less likely to give in to contextual cues (e.g., give
in to group pressure to alter the verdict). Some attitudes are especially resistant to change. Past
experience with particular attitude objects creates an individual’s tendency to respond to
particular attitude objects either positively or negatively (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007). Attitudes
resulting from direct experience are much more resistant to counter-attitudinal messages than
attitudes formed by indirect experience (Pornpitakpan, 2004; Wu & Shaffer, 1987).
The personality characteristics of the individuals serving on the jury could be expected to
serve as potential moderating variables in the attitude-behavior relationship (Petty et al., 1997).
Past research has shown that high self monitors, people who rely on situational cues to guide
behavior, have lower attitude-behavior consistency than low self monitors, individuals who rely
on internal cues such as attitudes to guide behavior (Kraus, 1995; Petty et al., 1997). Thus, it
would be expected that jurors who rely on situational cues to guide behavior, such as low self
8

monitors, may be more likely to change from their initial verdict preferences in response to the
context of the group deliberation.
Therefore, the characteristics of the context should be considered. As researchers have
begun to recognize attitudes as “integrated cognitive structures” more so than as “isolated
cognitive elements” (Lavine, 1997, p. 735), the importance of the contextual factors surrounding
attitude-behavioral consistency has become more apparent. Context effects, which may result
from cues from the audience or surrounding group, influence an individual’s attitudes and
behavior in any given situation. That is, the stated evaluative judgment in any given situation is
influenced both by the preexisting attitude and by the particular context in which the evaluative
judgment is elicited (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007).
In a group context, group norms can have a strong impact on the attitude-behavior
relationship, especially when those norms are closely tied to “contextually salient group
memberships in the immediate social context” (Smith & Terry, 2003, p. 592). If group
membership were particularly salient to the individual in the given context, social norms may
promote an increased willingness to behave in a manner consistent with the group. In an
ambiguous situation, behaving in a manner consistent with the group provides the individual
with an indication of context-specific attitudes and behaviors that would be viewed as
appropriate (Smith & Terry, 2003).
In studying behavioral change, recognizing that evaluative responses, which result from
past experiences with the attitude object, differ from current evaluative responding, which is
influenced by the situation in addition to the attitude, can help provide insight into attitudebehavior inconsistency and behavioral change (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007). For example, if a
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person is surrounded by a group of other individuals with known views on a particular issue,
such as the trial case at hand, the person may exhibit behavior and evaluative judgments that may
appear inconsistent with prior attitudes in order to please the surrounding group (Prislin &
Wood, 2005). In this situation, the demands of the current situation may have a greater influence
on the person’s behavior than the preexisting evaluative judgment (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007).
1.1.6

Summary of Jury Research
In summary, despite the growing body of empirical literature on jury decision making,

few theoretical models have been developed to examine the decision process of the jury. The
“majority rules” hypothesis promoted by Kalven and Zeisel (1966) may partially explain the
dearth of research examining the actual deliberation process. The minority influence literature
provides some information about cases in which the “majority rules” hypothesis is not supported,
but little is known about the individual jurors who change their verdicts during the course of the
deliberation. The limited theoretical models of jury decision making, such as the Social Decision
Scheme Model (Davis, 1973, 1980; Stasser et al., 1982), have expanded upon this insight to
predict the final jury verdict based on the initial distribution of individual jurors’ verdicts.
1.2

Theoretical Approaches
Researchers who have contributed to the group decision making literature have long

theorized about how groups reach their decisions. To work effectively, groups must reach some
level of consensus among group members to select a group choice (Baron & Kerr, 2003). As
noted previously, Kalven and Zeisel (1966) were among the first authors to posit a “majority
rules” decision making rule for jury decision making. The “majority rules” criterion is applicable
to the jury context where, in most cases, a unanimous vote is required (Vidmar & Hans, 2007).
10

Davis (1969) enumerated three types of questions pertinent to group decision making
performance: How does being in a group affect individual performance? How does group
performance compare to individual performance? And, how are individual resources combined
to yield the group product? In the mock jury literature, Davis’ third question is especially
relevant. Specifically, how do individual jurors’ interpretations of trial evidence and initial
verdict preferences combine to create the group verdict?
1.2.1

Social Combination Models
The social combination approach focuses on how these initial, individual preferences are

combined into the unanimous group decision while largely ignoring the discussion process that
leads to the group decision (Baron & Kerr, 2003; Parks & Nelson, 1999). This approach allows
the researcher to predict the final group decision based on the pattern of individual group
members’ decision preferences before the group discussion.
Davis’ Social Decision Scheme (SDS) model (1973) is one example of the social
combination approach frequently applied to the mock jury decision making paradigm. In the
1970’s and 1980’s, mathematical models, such as the Social Decision Scheme model, were
viewed as a breakthrough for examining the theoretical processes contributing to jury decision
making. The Social Decision Scheme (SDS) model examines how disparate initial preferences of
individual group members translate into the final group decision (Davis, 1973; Foss, 1976; Kerr,
Stasser, & Davis, 1979; Stasser, 1999; Stasser et al., 1982). Four basic elements compose the
SDS model (for a comprehensive review of the model, see Stasser, 1999): individual preferences,
group composition, collective responses, and group influence process. As defined by Stasser
(1999): (a) individual preferences describe an individual’s selection of one particular option from
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a set of response alternatives, (b) group composition is represented as the distribution of
individual preferences among group members, (c) collective response refers to the finite set of
response options for the group, and (d) consensus processes summarize the associations among
the initial group composition and the possible group responses.
The SDS model and similar mathematical models can be used to predict a group verdict
based on the distribution of individual group members pre-deliberation preferences. However,
these models cannot account for specific individual differences that may result in deviations
from the model predictions. Further, the probabilistic process underlying the SDS model does
not shed much light on the actual group decision making procedure.
1.2.2

Social Communication Models
Social communication models offer some insight into how juries shift from an initial state

of disagreement to a state of agreement. This approach assumes that the group decision can best
be understood by listening to what group members say to one another through an analysis of
discussion content (Baron, Kerr, & Miller, 1992; Baron & Kerr, 2003; Parks & Nelson, 1999).
This approach offers the advantage of understanding the process of opinion change in the group,
tracking how the group discussion alters individuals’ impressions of evidence, and analyzing
discussion styles of majority and minority factions within the group. However, this approach
does not provide information on how initial individual preferences are combined into the single,
group decision (Parks & Nelson, 1999).
1.2.3

A Combined Approach
A primary criticism of the social combination approach has been that models using this

framework provide little to no information about the interpersonal interactions that resulted in
12

the group decision. That is, we receive no information on how these decisions are reached; we
can only predict the final selection based on the initial preferences. The social communication
approach is similarly limited in that the individual group member’s initial preferences are largely
overlooked. Neither approach alone holds the key to understanding the group decision making
process (Baron & Kerr, 2003). Thus, integrating the social combination and the social
communication approaches may be ideal for examining how the initial distribution of jurors’
verdicts is integrated into the final group decision.
Both the social combination and the social communication approaches have contributed
to a greater understanding of the jury decision making process; however, few researchers have
combined these two approaches. Davis (1980) offered early hypotheses incorporating the two
theoretical approaches, suggesting that the initial pattern of individual decision preferences could
influence rates of participation in discussions. Hawkins (1960) found support for differences in
group communication based on the initial pattern of individual verdict preferences. Specifically,
the number of statements directed toward mock jurors supporting the opposite viewpoint steadily
increased throughout the duration of the deliberation until the group’s decision became obvious
and inter-faction discussion again ceased. Parks and Nelson (1999) studied the early hypotheses
suggested by Hawkins (1960) and Davis (1980) and found connections between initial
preference distributions and the content of the group deliberation. These researchers proposed
that additional work be done to integrate the social communication and social combination
approaches. Despite these early attempts and revived interest in a combined methodology, little
research on the jury deliberation has been conducted under a combined social combination and
social communication approach.
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1.3

Current Study
As described previously, limited work has been conducted to establish a theoretical

framework useful for assessing jury decision making. The social combination and the social
communication approaches provide some insight into this process; however analysis of these
methods is scarce due, in part, to their limited applicability. The purpose of the current study is to
examine the jury deliberation process using a combined theoretical approach. A combined
approach – designed to assess the probabilistic patterns of combining individual decisions into
group decisions, the communication patterns of the discussion content, and the inter-relations
among these patterns – is a logical next step for advancing the field. Drawing from the extensive
small-group communication literature, this combined approach could yield necessary
advancement to the theoretical work on jury decision making. In addition, a combined approach
allows for an in-depth examination of factors related to minority group influence and verdict
change.
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH QUESTIONS
A series of inter-related, but distinct, research questions are proposed. Under each
research question, specific hypotheses are offered based on the literature. Research question 1
follows the social combination approach. Research question 2 follows the social communication
approach. Research questions 3 and 4 are analyzed under a combined theoretical approach.
2.1

Research Question 1: Can verdict be predicted based on initial verdict composition?

2.1.1

Hypothesis 1
Based on prior work conducted on the social combination approach (e.g., Davis, 1973;

Foss, 1976; Kerr et al., 1979; Stasser, 1999; Stasser et al., 1982), it is hypothesized that final
verdict can be predicted based on the initial composition of individual mock jurors’ verdicts.
Previous research has suggested that the group verdict corresponds with the initial majority 90%
of the time (Baron & Kerr, 2003; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Stasser et al., 1982; Tindale & Davis,
1983). Therefore, it is expected that the group verdict will be consistent with the majority of
individual verdict choices in 90% of the groups.
2.2

Research Question 2: Will initial preference distributions affect the nature of
subsequent discussions?

2.2.1

Hypothesis 2
It is expected that the initial pattern of verdict composition will affect the content of the

discussion such that the discussion focuses on evidence consistent with the initial majority’s
verdict preference. The human tendency is to seek out, recall, and accept information that is
consistent with previous beliefs about the world (Jonas, Schultz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001;
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Kunda, 1987; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Nickerson, 1998; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972, for
an application to jury research, see Bornstein & Greene, 2011). Individuals entering the
deliberation with a verdict preference would be expected to focus more on discussing
information in line with their own interpretation of the trial evidence and give more weight to
information provided by other jurors with similar viewpoints. Therefore, it would be expected
that the majority faction will dominate the discussion with case facts in line with their own
interpretation of the evidence. Thus, it is hypothesized that the information discussed during the
deliberation will be largely consistent with the viewpoint of the majority faction.
2.3

Research Question 3: Do individuals in the majority and the minority differ in their
participation in the deliberation?

2.3.1

Hypothesis 3
It is hypothesized that the initial distribution of pre-deliberation individual verdict

preferences will affect the process of the discussion such that individuals in the majority faction
(either pro-conviction or pro-acquittal) will participate more than individuals in the minority
faction. Majorities, on the basis of their greater numbers, can dominate discussions and offer
more information in favor of their viewpoint (Stasser, Stella, Hanna, & Colella, 1984). Because
most juries will ultimately select a final verdict consistent with the viewpoint of the majority
(Baron & Kerr, 2003; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Stasser et al., 1982; Tindale & Davis, 1983), in
most cases, a strong minority faction will not be apparent and the viewpoint of the majority is
expected to dominate the discussion (research question 2). Past research would suggest that
individuals in the majority faction, in recognizing that their individual verdict preference is
shared by the majority of mock jurors, may discuss their viewpoints more extensively because
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these attitudes are in line with group norm. In contrast, individuals who realize that their verdict
preference is in the minority may feel less inclined to emphasize this divergence of opinions
(Smith & Terry, 2003; Wellen, Hogg, & Terry, 1998; Wood, 2000).
2.4

Research Question 4: What factors are associated with verdict change?

2.4.1

Hypothesis 4a
It is hypothesized that individuals who change their verdict will participate in the

deliberation to a lesser extent than individuals who do not change their verdict. Because it is
expected that the majority will prevail in most group decisions (Baron & Kerr, 2003; Kalven &
Zeisel, 1966; Stasser et al., 1982; Tindale & Davis, 1983), individuals who change their decision
are likely to originally be in the minority faction.
2.4.2

Hypothesis 4b
It is hypothesized that individuals who change their verdict will initially express less

confidence in their individual verdicts than non-changers. Previous research in jury decision
making (Diamond & Casper, 1992) has found that jurors who changed their verdict preference
following deliberation expressed less confidence in their pre-deliberation verdicts than nonchangers. In group decision making studies, individuals who initially express more confidence in
their judgments, regardless of their accuracy, have been found to behave in a manner consistent
with that original attitude, to be less likely to give into contextual cues (e.g., group pressure), and
to be more influential during the group decision, which may lead to an outcome consistent with
their initial outlook (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007; Wood, 2000; Zarnoth & Sniezek, 1997).
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2.4.3

Hypothesis 4c.
Finally, it is hypothesized that individuals who change their verdict during the

deliberation will express less confidence in the group verdict than non-changers. Petty, Tormala,
Briñol, and Jarvis (2006) showed that individuals who changed their attitudes exhibited
decreased levels of confidence in that attitude compared to non-changers. Changers may also
acquiesce to the group decision without truly changing their underlying attitude, which would
decrease confidence in the final group decision (Davis, 1973).
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
3.1

Participants
Participants were 216 undergraduate students from the University of Texas at El Paso. A

power analysis was conducted for each proposed analysis to determine the minimum number of
participants needed in this study to detect a small to medium-sized effect (Cohen, 1992). The 216
mock jurors participated in 37, five- and six-person mock juries. The demographics of the
sample reflected that of the university: 82.2% Hispanic, 59.5% women. The average age of
participants was 22.87 years. Table 1 displays the juror-level descriptive statistics.
Sixteen mock juries (93 participants) were recruited from the undergraduate research
pool that included students in lower-level psychology courses who received compensation in the
form of experimetrix credit or extra credit for their course. Twenty-one mock juries (123
participants) completed the experiment as a class activity in their Law and Psychology course.
Descriptive analyses showed no significant differences between the two groups of students.
3.2

Procedure
Participants completed the experiment in two sessions. Descriptions of the materials used

in the current study appear following a brief explanation of the procedure. Detailed descriptions
of all project materials, including the materials not used in the data analysis for the current study,
are available in Appendix A.
3.2.1

Session 1
The first session was completed online. Participants received a link to the online study

via the experimetrix program or directly from the researcher. After providing their consent,
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participants were granted access to the study materials. Session 1 included a voir dire
questionnaire, a trial transcript, a request for an individual verdict decision, and a post
individual verdict questionnaire, completed in that order. Participants in the general experimetrix
pool who completed Session 1 were asked to provide contact information (e.g., email address)
and consent for the experimenter to contact them about future sessions. Participants were
reminded that participation in Session 2 was completely voluntary and would not influence their
credit for Session 1. Participants who completed the study as part of their Law and Psychology
course completed Session 1 on their own time as a class homework assignment and completed
Session 2 during a class period. These participants were given the option to complete an
alternative research assignment for course credit.
3.2.2

Session 2
Six-person mock juries were constructed to manipulate the ratio of participants favoring

conviction to participants favoring acquittals. Four possible group combinations were
constructed based on individual verdicts: five for conviction, one for acquittal (strong majority
conviction); four for conviction, two for acquittal (weak majority conviction); five for acquittal,
one for conviction (strong majority acquittal); four for acquittal, two for conviction (weak
majority acquittal).
In certain sessions, fewer than six students attended Session 2 (n = 26). If three or more
participants attended the session, the researcher conducted the experiment, but only mock juries
including five or six participants were included in the current study. In rare cases where fewer
than three students arrived for the experiment session, participants were given the option of
signing up for a different session, but were still credited for attending the experiment session as
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scheduled. In addition, 11 group sessions were conducted but ultimately excluded from the final
sample due to technical difficulties with the recording equipment.
After signing the consent forms and rereading the judge’s instructions, each mock jury
was asked to deliberate on the trial transcript each mock juror read during Session 1. If no verdict
was reached after one hour of deliberation, the group was considered a hung jury. After reaching
a group decision, the mock jury completed a post-deliberation group questionnaire together as a
group. Finally, each individual mock juror completed a post-deliberation individual
questionnaire separately. Participants were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation.
All deliberation sessions were audio and video recorded. Participants were informed that
each session would be recorded in the informed consent document. The researcher informed the
participants that the recording would be transcribed and that no personal or identifying
information would be included. Participants were given the option to request that their session
not be recorded; no participants made this request.
3.3

Materials

3.3.1

Voir Dire Questionnaire
The voir dire questionnaire (see Appendix B) collected basic demographic information

(e.g., age, gender, jury eligibility, and ethnicity) about each participant.
3.3.2

Trial Transcript
Participants read a trial transcript (see Appendix C) that described a burglary of a

habitation trial. This transcript previously has been shown to produce nearly equal frequencies of
convictions and acquittals. In the transcript, a woman arrives home to find that her residence has
been burglarized and a specified amount of money and a gold watch are missing. When
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questioned by the police, the woman provides a detailed description of a vehicle she saw leaving
her driveway. The defendant is found in his vehicle, which matches the description, nearby the
woman’s residence. When his vehicle is searched, several watches and a large sum of money are
found in addition to a toolbox containing tools similar to those used in the burglary. The
testimony and cross-examination of the victim, a police officer, and the defendant were
presented in the transcript.
3.3.3

Individual Verdict Form
The verdict form (see Appendix D) asked participants to render an individual verdict of

either Guilty or Not-Guilty. Participants rated their confidence in their personal verdict decision
on a scale from 1 = “Very Unsure” to 5 = “Very Confident.”
3.3.4

Post Individual Verdict Questionnaire
The post individual verdict questionnaire (see Appendix E) was used to assess individual

participants’ interpretations of the evidence, perceptions of the strength of evidence against the
defendant, and opinions about trial participants.
3.3.5

Post-Deliberation Group Questionnaire
The post-deliberation group questionnaire (see Appendix F) asked the participants in

each mock jury to reach a unanimous group verdict to find the defendant either Guilty or NotGuilty. This form also asked about the group’s use of the evidence during the deliberation. All
members of the group completed this form together following the group decision. The group was
provided with a checklist of the facts in evidence and was asked to check all facts discussed
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during the deliberation. In addition, the group rated each fact discussed as supporting the
prosecution, the defense, or neither (i.e., neutral).
3.3.6

Post-Deliberation Individual Questionnaire
Each individual mock juror completed a post-deliberation individual questionnaire

separately after the group deliberation (see Appendix G). Participants were asked to indicate
their group’s decision and their confidence in the group’s decision. Participants rated their
confidence in the group verdict decision on a scale from 1 = “Very Unsure” to 5 = “Very
Confident.” Participants indicated their personal verdict decision and whether they changed from
their initial individual decision. Participants who changed from their initial verdict selection were
asked about their reasons for changing their position. Finally, participants answered a series of
questions about the group decision process that included self-ratings (e.g., “How motivated were
you to persuade group members to see things from your point of view?”) and ratings of each
other group members (e.g., “How similar is this person to you?”).
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
4.1

Deliberation Coding
All group deliberations were audio and video recorded and transcribed professionally.

Transcriptions were coded by trained research assistants to assess participation patterns among
mock jurors and deliberation content.
4.1.1

Participation
Participation in the deliberation was coded by total speaking time (i.e., count in minutes

of speech), number of turns taken during the deliberation, and units meaningful speech as
measured by a modified word-count procedure devised by Dickinson and Poole (2000). This
coding procedure removes hedges, hesitations, conjunctions, and articles and has been used
previously in eyewitness research (e.g., Dickinson & Poole, 2000). A single coder completed all
coding for participation (see Appendix H).
4.1.2

Deliberation Content
Deliberation content was assessed by coding for the type of evidence discussed by each

group. The content of the trial transcript used in the current study has previously been coded to
determine baseline counts of facts in evidence: 43 general facts (e.g., time of arrest), nine proprosecution facts (e.g., the defendant drove a car similar to the one described leaving the scene),
and nine pro-defense facts (e.g., the witness could not identify the stolen watch).
Each deliberation transcript was coded to examine the group’s discussion of the primary
facts in evidence. The content of each deliberation was compared to the previously established
baseline rates to determine the number of pro-prosecution, pro-defense, and general facts in
evidence discussed by each group. Further, the deliberations were coded for additional content
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including trial-related discussion not related to the evidence (e.g., judge’s instructions,
reasonable doubt), personal experiences related to the case or the trial (e.g., experience serving
on a jury previously), discussion related to procedures (e.g., selection of the fore-person), and
non trial-related discussion (e.g., small talk). Inter-rater reliability was found to be k = .40, p <
.001, 95% CI [.33, .47], which is indicative of moderate agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977).
4.2

Preliminary Analyses

4.2.1

Data Source and Group Size
Data were collected from Introductory courses (n = 16 juries 1) and from upper-level Law

and Psychology courses (n = 21). Initial analyses were conducted to ensure that there were no
significant differences due to course type. At the jury level, mean deliberation length, jury
composition, deliberation style, and group verdict outcome did not differ by class. Juries
composed of five (n = 6 juries) or six (n = 31 juries) participants were included in the study.
Again, mean deliberation length, jury composition, deliberation style, and group verdict outcome
did not differ by group size.
4.2.2

Deliberation Style
In the current study, 32.4% of groups were categorized as evidence-driven deliberations

(i.e., began with a discussion of the evidence), and 67.6% of groups were categorized as verdictdriven deliberations (i.e., began with a vote). At the jury level, there was no difference in the
frequency of polling according to jury style, F(1, 35) = 0.09, p =.77, or in deliberation length,
F(1, 35) = 2.31, p = .14. Of the 12 evidence-driven juries, one jury (8.3%) ended as a hung jury,
and five (20.0%) of the 25 verdict-driven juries ended as hung juries, zprop = 1.03, p > .05.
1

Technically, all juries analyzed for this study are “mock juries,” and all participants are “mock jurors.” However,
to avoid verbosity, mock juries will be referred to simply as “juries,” and mock jurors will be referred to as “jurors”
throughout the results section. Distinctions between real and mock jurors and juries will be made as necessary in the
discussion section.
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4.2.3

Juror- and Jury-Level Verdicts
Participants rendered individual, pre-deliberation verdicts during Session 1. Consistent

with prior administrations of this trial transcript (e.g., Schmersal, 2009), 51.3% of individual
jurors rendered a verdict in favor of conviction, and 48.7% rendered a verdict in favor of
acquittal. Jury composition was manipulated to produce a numerical majority in each group.
There were 68.4% of jurors in the numerical majority in their group, and the remaining 28.8% of
jurors were in the numerical minority (see Table 1).
Jury-level group verdicts were rendered at the end of each deliberation. Consistent with
the leniency hypothesis, which suggests that juries favor acquittal more often than individual
jurors (Devine et al., 2001; MacCoun & Kerr, 1988), there were more acquittals at the group
level than at the individual pre-deliberation level: 32.4% of groups rendered a final verdict in
favor of conviction, 51.4% of groups were in favor of acquittal, and 16.2% were considered to be
hung juries. Mean deliberation length differed significantly across the three deliberation
outcomes, F (2, 34) = 8.03, p = .001. Juries that did not reach a final decision (i.e., hung juries),
M(SD) = 38.05 (18.61) minutes, 95% CI [18.46, 57.65], deliberated significantly longer than
juries that voted in favor of conviction, M(SD) = 14.21 (7.12) minutes, 95% CI [9.68, 18.73],
t(34) = -3.67, p = .001, and significantly longer than juries that voted in favor of acquittal, M(SD)
= 15.15 (13.82) minutes, 95% CI [8.49, 21.81], t(34) = -3.77, p = .001. Juries reaching a verdict
either in favor of conviction or in favor of acquittal did not differ significantly in deliberation
length, t(34) = -0.196, p = .845.
4.2.4

Group Composition
The composition of each group was manipulated to create four conditions based on pre-

deliberation individual verdict (see Table 2). Final conditions included five- and six-person juries
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and were coded as: (a) strong majority conviction, with pre-deliberation verdict compositions of
five (or four) conviction to one acquittal (n = 7), (b) weak majority conviction, with predeliberation verdict compositions of four (or three) conviction to two acquittal (n = 12), (c)
strong majority acquittal with pre-deliberation verdict compositions of five (or four) acquittal to
one conviction (n = 7), and (d) weak majority acquittal, with pre-deliberation verdict
compositions of four (or three) acquittal to two conviction (n = 11). Mean deliberation length did
not differ by condition (see Table 3).
4.3

Social Combination Approach
It was hypothesized that the final group verdict could be predicted based on the initial

composition (i.e., decision scheme; Davis, 1973; Smoke & Zajonc, 1962) of pre-deliberation
individual verdicts. Previous research has suggested that the group verdict corresponds with the
initial majority – the “majority rules” hypothesis (Baron & Kerr, 2003; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966;
MacCoun & Kerr, 1988; Stasser et al., 1982; Tindale & Davis, 1983). This analysis was
conducted at the jury level examining the distribution of pre-deliberation verdict preference for
the 37 mock juries by final group verdict. An analysis of decision schemes is most appropriately
conducted at the aggregate level because it examines distributions of individual preferences
within a sample of groups (Parks & Nelson, 1999).
Davis (1973) pointed out that the number of decision outcomes for an individual juror is
different than for a group jury. That is, an individual juror reaches a personal preference of
“guilty” or “not guilty.” A group jury can render a verdict in favor of conviction, vote in favor of
acquittal, or fail to reach a decision. In the current study, there were four possible distribution
conditions based on two individual decision preferences: conviction and acquittal. At the group
decision level, there were three possible outcomes: conviction, acquittal, and hung.
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Consistent with the hypothesis, the initial distribution of pre-deliberation verdicts was
associated with final group verdict, χ2 (6) = 25.01, p < .001 (see Table 4). When including hung
juries in the analysis, 67.5% of groups favored the initial majority’s verdict, 16.2% of groups
favored the initial minority’s verdict, and 16.2% were declared a hung jury. Consistent with
previous observations (e.g., Davis, 1973; Schubert, 1965), no juries in the extreme (i.e., strong
majority conviction or strong majority acquittal) selected a final group verdict that differed from
the initial majority’s decision. Of the groups with a distribution of weak majority conviction, five
juries (13.5%) voted in favor of acquittal, consistent with the leniency hypothesis (MacCoun &
Kerr, 1988). One jury (2.7%) with an initial distribution of weak majority acquittal rendered a
group verdict in favor of conviction.
A second analysis examined only groups in which a final verdict was rendered (i.e.,
excluded hung juries). Once again, pre-deliberation verdict distribution was significantly
associated with final group decision, χ2 (3) = 17.95, p < .001, and 80.7% of the juries that
reached a final verdict chose a group verdict consistent with the initial majority (see Table 5).
4.4

Social Communication Approach
The social communication approach emphasizes an analysis of discussion content (Baron

et al., 1992). This approach allows the researcher to examine global themes that may relate to
opinion change and lead the discussion toward a final group decision; however, it provides
limited insight into the explicit preferences of individual members or how those preferences are
combined into one group decision.
To examine the types of evidence discussed during the group deliberation at the jury
level, all jury transcriptions were coded to assess themes. Differences were examined by predeliberation verdict distribution. It was hypothesized that the initial distribution of pre-
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deliberation verdict preferences would affect the content of the discussion such that the
discussion would focus on evidence consistent with the initial majority’s verdict preference.
Exploratory analyses were also conducted to see if discussion content varied by deliberation
style or by final verdict outcome.
4.4.1

Emergent Themes
Data were coded to determine the total number of pro-prosecution, pro-defense, and

general facts in evidence discussed by each group. A qualitative assessment of the transcripts
showed a number of emergent themes. Three major themes from the trial transcript factored
heavily into almost all deliberations, and in most deliberations, at least one representative case
fact was mentioned about: (a) the car driven by the defendant (at least one case fact about the car
was mentioned in 94.6% of juries), (b) the amount of money in the defendant’s possession (at
least one case fact about the money was mentioned in 94.6% of juries), and (c) the similar watch
in the defendant’s possession (at least one case fact about the watch was mentioned in 100% of
juries). Examples of representative case facts under each major theme are listed in Table 6.
After deliberation, each jury was asked to list the key facts in evidence that influenced
their decision. Twenty-eight juries (75.7%) listed the description of the car as a key fact in
evidence, and eight (21.6%) juries listed the description of the car as the most influential fact in
making their decision. Twenty juries indicated that the description of the car supported the
prosecution’s case; seven juries indicated that the description of the car supported the defense’s
case. Although 27 juries (72.9%) listed the money as a key fact discussed during the deliberation,
only one jury (2.75%) listed the money as the most influential fact in evidence. Fifteen juries
perceived that the information about the money supported the prosecution; nine juries believed
that this information supported the defense. Thirty-three juries (89.2%) listed the watch as a key
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fact in evidence influencing the final verdict decision; eight juries (21.6%) listed the watch as the
primary fact in evidence influencing the final verdict decision. Seventeen juries perceived the
watch to be a fact supporting the prosecution; 11 juries perceived the watch to be a fact in
support of the defense.
In addition to discussing facts in evidence about these three overarching themes, the
majority of juries discussed the fact that the defendant was reported to be intoxicated at the time
of the crime (83.8%), the fact that the defendant claimed to be with his girlfriend at the time of
the crime (73.0%), the fact that the defendant had tools in the back of his car (89.2%), and the
fact that the defendant claimed to have won the watch in question at a poker game (78.4%).
For several juries, what was not presented at the trial was almost as important as what
was. Twenty (54.1%) juries talked about the fact that the defendant’s girlfriend did not testify to
corroborate his alibi. One jury listed this as the most influential fact in their decision. For
example, Jury 32 believed that the girlfriend’s testimony could have made the difference
between a conviction and acquittal.
“Just the whole girlfriend thing would’ve been so important. If she would’ve just
testified, that would’ve been it. That’s enough evidence; that’s enough because that’s his
alibi and I think that’s the most important.” Juror 34, Jury 32 (32:36 to 32:49)
4.4.2

Evidence Discussed and Jury Characteristics
A series of multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) tests were conducted to

determine if the type of evidence discussed during the deliberation was influenced by jury-level
characteristics. The total number of pro-prosecution facts discussed, pro-defense facts discussed,
and general facts discussed during the deliberation were included as dependent variables. Due to
substantial departures from normality, the total number of pro-prosecution facts and the total
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number of pro-defense facts were transformed using the log 10 transformation. The length of the
deliberation was included in each analysis as a covariate.
It was expected that the juries would discuss more evidence consistent with the outlook
of the initial majority. That is, juries with an initial majority in favor of conviction would discuss
more pro-prosecution evidence, and juries with an initial majority in favor of acquittal would
discuss more pro-defense evidence. For this analysis, the strong and weak majority conviction
conditions based on the distribution of pre-deliberation individual verdict preferences were
combined into one condition (n = 19). Similarly, the strong and weak majority acquittal
conditions were combined into one condition (n = 18).
With the use of Wilks’ criterion, the combined dependent variables were not significantly
related to the pre-deliberation distribution of individual verdicts, F(3, 31) = 1.05, p = .384, partial
η2 = .09. After adjusting for differences on the covariate, the univariate analyses showed that the
initial distribution of pre-deliberation verdicts was not associated with a difference in the number
of pro-prosecution, F(1, 33) = 0.84, p = .365, partial η2 = .03, pro-defense, F(1, 33) = 2.13, p =
.154, partial η2 = .06, or general facts in evidence discussed, F(1, 33) = 0.02, p = .884, partial η2
= .001. The combined dependent variables were significantly related to the covariate,
deliberation length, under the Wilks’ criterion, F(3, 31) = 24.31, p < .001, partial η2 = .70.
Evidence discussed did not differ by deliberation style. The combined dependent
variables were not related to deliberation style using the Wilks’ criterion, F(3, 31) = 0.21, p =
.488, partial η2 = .02. Univariate analyses indicated that, after adjusting for differences on the
covariate, verdict-driven and evidence-driven deliberations did not differ in the number of proprosecution, F(1, 33) = 0.04, p = .843, partial η2 = .001, pro-defense, F(1, 33) = 0.004, p = .95,
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partial η2 = .001, or general facts in evidence discussed, F(1, 33) = 0.52, p = .476, partial η2 =
.02.
A second analysis was conducted to see if the number of facts discussed differed by the
size of the majority. For this analysis, the strong majority conviction and strong majority
acquittal conditions were combined into one condition (n = 14), and the weak majority
conviction and weak majority acquittal conditions were combined into one condition (n = 23).
Two new dependent variables were created. The first new variable looked at the number of facts
in support of the majority’s point of view each group discussed (i.e., the number of proprosecution facts for majority conviction groups and the number of pro-defense facts for
majority acquittal groups). The second new variable examined the number of facts in opposition
to the majority’s viewpoint that were discussed. A separate analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
analysis was conducted to examine each new dependent variable. The length of deliberation was
controlled in each analysis. There were no significant differences for either supporting, F(1, 34)
= 1.43, p = .241, partial η2 = .04, or opposing, F(1, 34) = 0.31, p = .581, partial η2 = .04,
evidence discussed by strong or weak majorities.
4.4.3

Evidence Discussed and Final Verdict
Whether the evidence discussed during the deliberation was related to the final verdict

outcome was examined next. With the use of Wilks’ criterion, the combined dependent variables
were not significantly related to final verdict outcome, F(6, 60) = 2.35, p = .064, partial η2 = .18.
At the univariate level, after controlling for the covariate, there was a significant difference in the
number of pro-prosecution facts in evidence the juries had discussed, F(2, 32) = 3.38, p = .05,
partial η2 = .17. As expected, Helmert contrast comparisons showed that juries that rendered a
final verdict in favor of conviction had discussed significantly more pro-prosecution facts in
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evidence than either juries in favor of acquittal or hung juries, p = .015. The number of prodefense facts in evidence discussed, F(2, 32) = 0.89, p = .419, partial η2 = .05, and the number of
general facts in evidence discussed, F(2, 32) = 0.96, p = .395, partial η2 = .06, did not differ by
final verdict outcome.
4.4.4

Reasonable Doubt
The concept of reasonable doubt was brought up in 31 (83.8%) of the deliberations.

Jurors used this standard as both an argument for conviction and for acquittal. In 11 (29.7%) of
the juries, the concept of reasonable doubt was mentioned in support of the prosecution’s case at
least once. Reasonable doubt was mentioned in support of the defense in 23 (62.2%) of the
juries. Interestingly, when examining only the 12 juries in which a verdict in favor of conviction
was rendered, the concept of reasonable doubt came up in eight (66.7%) of the juries, and in
support of the defense in only five (41.7%) of the juries. In contrast, 17 (89.5%) of 19 juries that
ended in acquittal mentioned the concept of reasonable doubt, and 12 (63.2%) of the juries
ending in acquittal specifically mentioned reasonable doubt in support of the defense.
Reasonable doubt was brought up in favor of the defense in all six hung juries; in three hung
juries, reasonable doubt was mentioned in support of the prosecution. Although these descriptive
differences are interesting, the number of times reasonable doubt was mentioned during the
deliberation did not differ significantly by final verdict outcome, F(2, 33) = 0.47, p = .628,
partial η2 = .03.
4.5

Combined Theoretical Approach
The data analyzed under the social combination approach demonstrated that the majority

(67.5%) of juries selected a final group decision consistent with the initial majority. This
research question, analyzed at the jury level, provided a probabilistic estimate of the final
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decision based on the distribution of individual pre-deliberation preferences (decision scheme).
This social combination approach provided an interesting overview of final verdict selection, but
gave no insight into how the groups reached their decisions. The data analyzed under the social
communication approach provided interesting insights about the types of evidence discussed by
jurors. Contrary to the hypothesis, the distribution of pre-deliberation verdicts did not affect the
type of evidence discussed during the group deliberation.
To gain a greater understanding of the deliberation process, the last two research
questions were examined under a combined theoretical approach. These analyses explored how
initial verdict preferences influenced jurors’ engagement in the deliberation, which may
ultimately affect final verdict outcomes, and what factors were associated with verdict change.
4.5.1

Analytic Strategy
Data analysis for jury decision making studies is complicated by the two levels of

observation: jurors (n = 216) and juries (n = 37). When looking at jury-level predictors and
outcomes, as in research questions 1 and 2, there is only one level of analysis, and juries, rather
than individual jurors, are an appropriate unit of analysis. But when looking at juror-level
predictors and outcomes, traditional single-level approaches are not appropriate. Individual juror
behaviors take place within the context of specific juries; that is, jurors are nested within juries.
Jurors within the same juries are likely to influence one another, making them more similar in
some ways than jurors serving on different jurors.
Using traditional approaches such as ANOVA or regression to examine multilevel data as
if all data are on the same level can lead to statistical errors and misleading interpretations of
results (Hox, 2002; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Type 1 errors
become more likely when the assumption of the independence of error terms is violated.
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Multilevel modeling does not require independence of error terms (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Recent publications (e.g., Cornwell & Hans, 2011; Wright, Strubler, & Vallano, 2010) have
promoted the use of multilevel techniques, specifically mixed models and hierarchical linear
modeling, in jury decision making studies to address these concerns.
Multilevel models offer three major advantages: First, the standard errors are adjusted to
account for non-independence of jurors who are grouped within the same jury. Second, this
modeling technique allows the research to estimate variation within juries (juror level) and
variation across juries (jury level). Third, multilevel modeling allows for the investigation of
cross-level interactions to test whether the estimated slopes (i.e., coefficients) for juror
characteristics vary according to jury characteristics.
4.5.2

Participation in the Deliberation
This study examined whether participation in the jury deliberation was related to juror-

level characteristics (e.g., in the numerical majority, verdict change) and to jury-level
characteristics (e.g., deliberation style). Researchers have long studied participation to
understand individual jurors’ influence in the group discussion and the factors that contribute to a
group decision (Cornwell & Hans, 2010; James, 1959; Strodtbeck et al., 1957; York & Cornwell,
2007). Juror participation in this study was defined by three proxy variables: the total speaking
time in minutes; the total number of turns during the deliberation; and the total number of
meaningful units of speech, defined by a modified word count.
Table 7 displays descriptive statistics summarizing the three measures of participation at
the juror level. On average, jurors spoke for approximately 2.75 minutes (164.78 seconds) during
their group deliberation, with a range of 0 minutes (0 seconds) to 25.23 minutes (1,514 seconds)
and a median of 1.46 minutes (87.50 seconds). Jurors took an average of 37.60 turns during their
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deliberation, with a range of 0 turns to 263 turns and a median of 26 turns. Each turn lasted 4.18
seconds, on average. Jurors provided an average of 449.70 meaningful units of speech (modified
word count) during each deliberation, with a range of 0 units of speech to 4,675 units of speech
and a median of 239 units of speech during the deliberation. Jurors provided an average of 10.84
units of speech per turn. As shown in Table 7, the three participation measures were correlated.
All three measures were also related to the length of the deliberation. That is, the longer the
deliberation, the more opportunity each juror had to speak. Therefore, deliberation length was
controlled for as a jury-level covariate in the models described below.
A preliminary analysis to examine overall participation for majority and minority factions
within the jury was conducted at the jury level (see Table 8). The average number of minutes of
spoken speech, number of turns taken, and units of speech provided by majority and minority
factions within the jury were compared. As expected, the majority faction as a whole spoke for
more time during the deliberation, t(36) = 5.41, p < .001, took more turns during the deliberation,
t(36) = 7.00, p < .001, and provided more units of speech during the deliberation, t(36) = 5.16, p
< .001.
To examine participation in the jury deliberation, both juror-level and jury-level variables
were used to examine a juror-level outcome (individual participation). The three correlated
participation variables were included in the model as dependant variables. A multivariate
multilevel model was used to examine individual jurors’ participation in the jury deliberation
using IBM SPSS Mixed models, version 19. Although there are different programs available to
analyze multilevel models, IBM SPSS offers great flexibility in estimating a wide variety of
multilevel models, including the ability to model multiple levels in a nested or cross-classified
data structure simultaneously (Heck, Thomas, & Tabata, 2010).
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4.5.3

Multivariate Multilevel Model
Multilevel models allow the researcher to explore different levels of analysis and cross-

analysis interactions without violating the assumption of independence. The final model had
three levels. In Level 1 (null model), the three dependent variables measuring participation were
nested within individual jurors as repeated measures (Leyland, 2004; Heck et al., 2010). In Level
2 (juror-level model), juror-level variables were included in the model as jurors were nested
within their respective juries. Finally, in Level 3 (jury-level model), juror-level and jury-level
variables were added into the model as jurors were nested within juries.
Two juror-level variables were added to the Level 2 model. The first variable was a
binary variable included to examine differences in participation between jurors who were in the
initial majority and jurors who were in the initial minority based on the pre-deliberation
distribution of individuals. The second juror-level variable was a binary variable to examine
differences in participation between jurors who changed from their pre-deliberation preference
and jurors who did not change from their pre-deliberation preference during the group
deliberation.
Two jury-level variables were added to the Level 3 model. Deliberation style, either
verdict-driven or evidence-driven, was included to see if the style of group deliberation
influenced individual jurors’ participation (Devine et al., 2001; Devine, Buddenbaum, Houp,
Stolle, & Studebaker, 2007; Foss, 1976). Deliberation length was included in the model as a
covariate. The full model considered all independent variables as fixed effects in line with the
recommendations of Heck et al. (2010) when examining multivariate multilevel models. The
grouping variable for the set of dependent variables was set as a random effect to fit a random
intercept model for each individual participation variable between juries.
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Table 9 shows the juror-level and jury-level model estimates, indicating that participation
varied within and across juries. In the Level 1 (null) model, the estimates of covariance
parameters showed significant variation to be explained in participation across juries. The null
model indicated that intercepts vary significantly across juries on each of the three dependent
variables: total number of minutes of spoken speech during the deliberation, Wald Z = 9.47, p <
.001, number of turns taken during the deliberation, Wald Z = 9.46, p < .001, and number of
units of speech uttered during the deliberation, Wald Z = 9.47, p < .001. Further, the intraclass
correlation, ρ = .67, suggested significant variability in participation across juries, underscoring
the appropriateness of a multilevel model.
In the Level 2 (juror-level) model, the Type III (sum of squares) tests of the fixed effects
showed that the effect of Majority, F(3, 301.27) = 3.71, p = .012, and Change, F(3, 311.99) =
3.13, p = .026, differ across the three assessments of juror-level participation 2. As shown in
Table 9, participants in the numerical minority spoke more, γ = 61.56, t(2624.77) = 2.38, p =
.017, took more turns, γ = 12.30, t(484.91) = 2.80, p = .005, and provided more units of speech, γ
= 194.68, t(58636.14) = 2.76, p = .006, than jurors in the numerical majority during the group
deliberation. Jurors who did not change their verdict preference during the group deliberation
took more turns during the group deliberation, γ = 9.58, t(485.04) = 2.14, p = .033, than jurors
who changed their verdict. Changers and non-changers did not differ in number of minutes of
spoken speech, γ = 28.09, t(1970.64) = 1.08, p = .282, or number of units of speech provided, γ =
107.28, t(7936.51) = 1.51, p = .132.

2

All denominator degrees of freedom in multilevel models apply the Satterthwaite correction for approximating the
denominator degrees of freedom for significance tests of fixed effects in models where there are unequal variances
and groups sizes (Heck et al., 2010).
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In the Level 3 (jury-level) model, jury-level independent and covariate variables were
incorporated into the model. The effect of Majority, F(3, 193.37) = 3.25, p = .023, differed
across dependent variables; however, Change, F(3, 205.23) = 2.42, p = .067, and Style, F(3,
96.23) = 2.52, p = .063, did not differ across the three dependent variables. As shown in Table 9,
participants in the numerical minority spoke more, γ = 56.38, t(215.00) = 1.96, p = .051, took
more turns, γ = 11.46, t(223.25) = 2.46, p = .015, and uttered more units of speech, γ = 179.88,
t(220.71) = 2.34, p = .02, than jurors in the numerical majority during the group deliberation. In
the full model, jurors who changed during the deliberation did not differ significantly from jurors
who did not change on any of the participation variables. The jury-level predictor examining
deliberation style significantly influenced participation such that jurors in verdict-driven
deliberations spoke more, γ = 70.31, t(311.82) = 2.21, p = .028, and provided a greater number
of units of speech during the deliberation, γ = 227.67, t(595.00) = 2.55, p = .01, than jurors in
evidence-driven deliberations. Jurors in verdict-driven deliberations took marginally more turns
than jurors in evidence-driven deliberations, γ = 14.96, t(72.05) = 1.95, p = .055. The Level 3
(jury-level) model accounted for more variation than the Level 1 (null) model, χ2 (9) = 43.95, p <
.05. That is, including the juror-level and jury-level predictors in the model improved the model
beyond just examining variability within jurors and between juries (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Table 10 displays the estimated marginal means for participation from the jury-level model.
4.5.4

Follow-Up Analyses on Changers
Analyses were conducted to examine individuals who changed their verdict during the

deliberation. It was hypothesized that jurors who changed their verdict would express less
confidence in their individual verdicts initially. A two-level model was constructed to predict
change from initial confidence, nesting jurors within juries. The null model indicated that
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intercepts did not vary significantly across juries, Wald Z = 0.04, p = .97. Further, the intraclass
correlation, ρ = .002, suggested that the proportion of the variance that lies between juries was
less than 1%. Therefore, multilevel techniques were not necessary to analyze this research
question. A binary logistic regression analysis showed that confidence in pre-deliberation verdict
did not significantly predict which jurors changed their verdict during the deliberation, β = -0.05,
odds ratio = 0.95, 95% CI [0.63, 1.43], Wald(1) = 0.06, p = .805.
Next, confidence ratings for changers and non-changers were examined by the final
group decision. A two-level model was developed to address between-jury variability (see Table
11). The null model showed significant variability in intercepts across juries, Wald Z = 3.13, p =
.002. The intraclass correlation, ρ = .36, suggested that approximately 36% of total variability in
final confidence ratings was between juries. Thus, multilevel modeling was necessary to examine
this research question.
The Level 1 (juror-level) model showed that changers and non-changers had significantly
different ratings of confidence in the final group decision, F(1, 178.88) = 11.04, p = .001. In the
Level 2 (jury-level) model, juror-level predictors (Change) and jury-level predictors and
covariates (Style and Deliberation Length) were included in the model to examine individual
jurors’ confidence in the final group decision. The Level 2 model also showed that changers and
non-changers had significantly different ratings of confidence in the final group decision, F(1,
179.13) = 11.39, p = .001. Changers were significantly less confident in the final group decision
than non-changers (see Table 12). Deliberation style did not significantly affect confidence
ratings in the final group decision, F(1, 32.29) = 0.003, p = .96. Deliberation length was
significantly associated with confidence ratings in the final group decision, F(1, 32.37) = 4.52, p
= .04, such that longer deliberations were associated with less overall confidence in the final
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group decision. Longer deliberations were also more likely to result in hung juries, which could
partially account for this finding.
Finally, descriptive analyses were conducted to examine verdict changers further (see
Table 13). A small number of jurors (6.3%) changed their verdicts prior to the group deliberation
– their individual verdict ratings at the end of Session 1 differed from the individual verdict
ratings at the start of Session 2. Approximately one third (31.6%) of jurors changed their verdicts
during the group deliberation. Jurors who changed their verdict during the deliberation were
more likely to change from an individual verdict for conviction to a group decision for acquittal
(68.3% of changers) than from an individual preference for acquittal to a group decision for
conviction (31.7% of changers), χ2(1) = 10.63, p = .001.
When examining changers only (n = 68), 39.7% of changers reported that they changed
to the majority decision during the deliberation. The majority of changers reported that their
decision to change was related, in part, to evidence that other group members brought up that
they had forgotten (54.4%), or that other group members helped them to rethink the evidence
(70.6%). Only 13.2% of changers reported perceiving coercion from other group members to
change to from their original verdict.
When asked at what point during the deliberation they changed their verdict, 17.9% of
changers reported that they changed their decision after hearing the verdict preferences of the
other group members. The majority of changers (84.7%) reported that they changed their
decision after discussing the evidence with other group members. A small number of changers
(10.3%) reported that they changed their decision after perceiving coercion from other group
members.
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Following the group deliberation, participants were asked to rate their perceptions of their
own participation in the group deliberation. Changers and non-changers did not differ in their
ratings of their motivation to get other participants to see the evidence from their point of view,
F(1, 211) = 1.33, p = .250. However, changers rated themselves as having more personal
influence on the group deliberation than non-changers rated themselves, F(1, 211) = 11.29, p =
.001.
4.6

Summary of the Findings

4.6.1

Social Combination Approach
This study found support for the “majority rules” hypothesis, but the minority prevailed

in more groups than would have been expected based on prior research (e.g., Baron & Kerr,
2003; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Stasser et al., 1982; Tindale & Davis, 1983). When all verdict
outcomes (i.e., conviction, acquittal, hung) were considered, 67.5% voted in line with the initial
majority. In other words, the minority faction prevailed in 16.2% of the juries or prevented the
majority faction from dominating the decision in the 16.2% of juries that were hung. When
analysis was restricted to only decision outcomes (i.e., conviction, acquittal), 80.7% of groups
reached a final verdict consistent with the initial majority.
4.6.2

Social Communication Approach
Three case facts were of primary interest to almost all of the juries; however, the jurors

differed in how they interpreted these facts in evidence. Some jurors focused on the similarities
between the witness’s descriptions and the defendant, in support of the prosecution; others
highlighted the differences, in support of the defense. The analyses indicated that the number of
facts in evidence discussed did not differ significantly by the distribution of pre-deliberation
individual verdict preferences or by the deliberation style. The evidence discussed during the
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deliberation was related to final verdict preference. Although there were no differences in the
number of general or pro-defense facts in evidence discussed, juries that ultimately rendered a
verdict in favor of conviction discussed significantly more pro-prosecution facts in evidence.
4.6.3

Combined Theoretical Approach
The multivariate multilevel model indicated that variance in participation resulted from

both juror- and jury-level variation. This model combined the social combination and social
communication theoretical approaches by examining how the initial distribution of predeliberation individual preferences influenced individual jurors’ participation in the group
deliberation. Although at the jury level, the majority faction participated more in the deliberation
than the minority faction, individual jurors in the minority faction participated more in the
deliberation based on all three participation outcome variables.
The multivariate multilevel model also provided information about individuals who
change their verdicts during the deliberation. The juror-level model, which nested jurors within
juries but did not include jury-level independent variables, showed that non-changers took
significantly more turns during the deliberation, but did not differ significantly in speaking time
or units of speech. This collection of findings suggests that, because changers take fewer turns
but do not actually speak less, changers take longer turns. However, follow-up analyses revealed
no differences in the average number of words spoken per turn or the average number of units of
speech provided per turn by changers and non-changers. In the full model, changers did not
differ from non-changers in participation, although the difference in the number of turns taken by
jurors could be labeled as marginally significant, p = .097.
The multivariate multilevel model showed that, at the juror level, non-changers took
significantly more turns during the deliberation, but did not differ significantly in speaking time
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or number of units of speech. In the jury-level model, changers did not differ from non-changers
in participation. Change during the deliberation could not be predicted by confidence in predeliberation individual verdict. However, changers and non-changers differed in their confidence
in the final group decision. As expected, changers expressed less confidence in the final group
decision. When examining changers’ self-reported reasons for changing, most changers reported
that discussing the evidence with other group members led them to change their decision. The
majority of changers also reported that they changed their verdict during the deliberation after a
group discussion of the evidence. Although changers and non-changers did not differ in their
perceptions of their own motivation to participate in the jury deliberation, changers actually
viewed themselves as more influential during the deliberation.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
In their landmark jury decision making study, Kalven and Zeisel (1966) neglected to
examine the deliberation process. They justified this decision by noting that, in most cases, the
pre-deliberation majority prevails, implying that the deliberation itself is of little interest or
importance (Salerno & Diamond, 2010). But research has shown that significant discussion often
precedes any vote (Hannaford-Agor, Hans, Mott, & Munsterman, 2002; Hans, 2007; Sandys &
Dillehay, 1995), making it difficult to determine at what point the “majority” should be declared.
At the end of their book, even Kalven and Zeisel admitted that ignoring the deliberation process
may have been a mistake (p. 482). The majority may prevail more often than not, but it is still
worthwhile to try to understand why.
Consistent with the findings of both empirical studies of mock jurors and postdeliberation surveys with actual jurors (Devine et al., 2001; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Stasser et al.,
1982; Tindale & Davis, 1983; Waters & Hans, 2009; Zeisel & Diamond, 1978), the current study
found that, once again, the majority prevailed. However, this does not tell the whole story. The
current study contributes to the field by its focus on the procedural and communicative processes
of the jury deliberation, examined under a combined theoretical approach.
5.1

Does the Majority Prevail?
The current study found support for the “majority rules” hypothesis; under a decision

scheme with three group outcomes (conviction, acquittal, hung), 67.5% of groups favored the
initial majority’s opinion. When hung juries were excluded from the analysis, 80.7% of groups
favored the initial majority’s opinion. The majority opinion was supported more often than not,
but the minority prevailed in more groups than would have been expected based on prior
research (e.g., Baron & Kerr, 2003; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Stasser et al., 1982; Tindale &
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Davis, 1983). Majorities in favor of acquittal prevailed more often than majorities in favor of
guilt; this finding is consistent with previous research on majority effects in the mock
deliberation (e.g., Davis et al., 1975; Nemeth, 1977) and with the leniency hypothesis (MacCoun
& Kerr, 1988).
5.2

What Do Jurors Talk About?
Most juries do not start the deliberation with a unanimous collection of individual verdict

preferences, and many do not begin with a vote of pre-deliberation preferences (Hannaford-Agor
et al., 2002; Hans, 2007; Sandys & Dillehay, 1995). Social combination models provide a
prediction of what the final outcome will be based on the initial distribution of individual verdict
preferences, but these models are limited in that they fail to account for what happens after the
initial poll (Penrod & Hastie, 1979; Reardon, 2008). In other words, these models can provide a
probabilistic guess of what the outcome will be, but they cannot provide any information about
how the individuals arrived at the group decision.
The current study also considered a social communication approach to provide
information about what evidence individuals use to reach the final group decision (Parks &
Nelson, 1999). Research about human cognitive processes has shown that the human tendency is
to seek out, recall, and accept information that is consistent with previous beliefs about the world
(Jonas et al., 2001; Kunda, 1987; Lord et al., 1979; Nickerson, 1998; Wason & Johnson-Laird,
1972). Therefore, it was expected that juries would focus on evidence more consistent with the
initial majority. In the current study, the outlook of the initial majority faction did not influence
the type of evidence discussed during the deliberation, although groups differed in how the
evidence was interpreted.
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The findings of the current study are promising; deliberation style and distribution of predeliberation individual verdict preferences do not seem to influence the type of evidence
discussed during the deliberation. Juries have shown that they can make good decisions, given
the evidence provided. And, when juries do make decisions that can be viewed as questionable,
their mistakes reflect “well-documented, universal psychological principles such as heuristic
reasoning and attribution errors” (Bornstein & Greene, 2011, p. 63). More research is necessary
to understand how groups as a whole interpret and weigh different types of evidence.
5.3

Who Participates in the Deliberation?

5.3.1

Importance of a Jury-Level Study
The current study contributes to the field by studying the decision making process of

mock juries rather than mock jurors, an important step in jury research (Nuñez, McCrea, &
Culhane, 2011). Groups have been criticized for being inefficient and inaccurate (see Baron,
Kerr, & Miller, 1992, for a review). Some researchers even refer to the effectiveness of group
decision making as an illusion (e.g., Janis, 1972; see Paulus, 1998 for a review). The decisions of
groups are influenced by the same cognitive processes that influence individual decision making
(Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Ruva, McEvoy, & Bryant, 2007), and social processes also figure
prominently into group decision making (Foss, 1976). Social interaction through the group
decision making process can produce group norms that dictate appropriate behavior (Turner,
1991; Wellen et al., 1998). Attitudes and behavior may be altered to remain consistent with what
is expected of a member of that group (Wellen et al., 1998).
Perhaps the most famous criticism of group decision making is the concept of groupthink
(Janis, 1972), which is relevant to any group decision making task. Groupthink is essentially
defined as “premature concurrence seeking” (McCauley, 1998, p. 143). In other words, group
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decision making can lead to poorer outcomes if group members yield to pressure to agree with
one another without exploring all the evidence at hand. Although the concept of groupthink is
frequently cited in studies examining group decision making processes, few studies have actually
examined the theory empirically (Esser, 1998). A review of the empirical literature (Park, 1998)
found that the groupthink hypotheses were only partially supported in most analyses.
In studying the application of groupthink theory to the jury context, Neck and Moorhead
(1992) “highlighted the jury’s use of methodical decision making procedures as the key to the
avoidance of groupthink” (Esser, 1998, p. 126). The current study also produced no clear
evidence of groupthink. Although the majority faction as a whole participated more than the
minority faction during the deliberation, individual jurors from the initial minority participated to
a greater extent than individual jurors from the initial majority. Further, the initial distribution of
pre-deliberation verdicts did not influence the type of evidence discussed during the deliberation;
evidence in favor of both sides was discussed equally.
5.3.2

Importance of Full Participation. The criticisms of group decision making led some

researchers and legal scholars to question the effectiveness of the American jury system (e.g.,
Hrycan, 2006). But because the jury still represents the ideal of fairness in the American judicial
procedure, other researchers stress the importance of full participation of all members of the jury
(Cornwell & Hans, 2011; Hans & Vidmar, 2008). For a jury to be truly representative, diverse
individual jurors should fully participate to offer a wide range of backgrounds, experiences,
knowledge, and points of view (Cornwell & Hans, 2011; Marder, 2002, Peters v. Kiff, 1972;
Sommers & Ellsworth, 2003).
The full participation of a cross-section of the community is viewed as a vital component
of a fair and impartial trial by jury (Klein & Klastorin, 1999; Taylor v. Louisiana, 1975).
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Beginning over 50 years ago with the Chicago Jury Project (e.g., James, 1959; Strodtbeck et al.,
1957), researchers have been interested in studying which jurors are more likely to participate in
the jury deliberation. Early studies focused on gender, ethnicity, and social class as important
predictors of participation and influence (e.g., Hastie et al., 1983a; James, 1959; Strodtbeck et
al., 1957). More recent research has suggested that demographic variables such as gender and
ethnicity no longer provide an indication of who will participate in the jury deliberation
(Cornwell & Hans, 2010; York & Cornwell, 2006), although social class still seems to be an
indicator of perceived influence (York & Cornwell, 2006).
5.3.3

Participation and Distribution of Individual Verdicts
The current study expanded on previous studies, which primarily examined differences in

participation based on juror demographic characteristics, to explore how initial verdict
distributions influenced participation. By using a combined theoretical approach, this study
addressed the initial distribution of individual jurors’ preferences and examined participation
processes within the deliberation. As a group, the majority faction spoke significantly longer,
took more turns, and contributed more units of speech to the deliberation. Hastie, Penrod, and
Pennington (1983b) indicated that large factions have more influence on the group’s decision
than small factions. Participation is one way in which influence is assessed (York & Cornwell,
2006), so it is reasonable to expect that large factions participate more during the group
deliberation than small factions.
However, contrary to the hypothesis, at the individual level, jurors in the minority faction
participated significantly more than jurors in the majority faction on all three measures of
participation. This result was, at first, surprising. It was hypothesized that the initial composition
of the jury would affect the process of the discussion such that majority faction members, in
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addition to the faction itself, would participate more than minority faction members in the group
deliberation.
Prior research suggests that individuals in the majority may feel more comfortable
discussing their viewpoints because these attitudes are in line with group norms (Smith & Terry,
2003; Wellen et al., 1998; Wood, 2000). Kerr, MacCoun, Hansen, and Hymes (1987) found that
jurors who lost support for their initial viewpoint or found themselves in the numerical minority
used a more cautious than argumentative style when discussing the evidence. Davis, Bray, and
Holt (1977) also concluded that initial faction size influenced individual juror participation, but
did not determine the exact nature of this influence (Parks & Nelson, 1999).
Consistent with the current findings, Hawkins (1960) pointed out that larger faction sizes
could lead to less participation because jurors in the majority faction share viewpoints with more
individuals and can rely on their fellow jurors to provide the evidence to support their outlook. In
contrast, jurors in the minority faction must provide all the evidence to support their position.
Hastie et al. (1983b) noted that, under a requirement for a unanimous decision rule as in the
current study, minority faction members participate more and are more influential than when a
unanimous decision is not required.
Thus, it appears that the majority faction, as a whole, contributes more to the discussion
in the amount of participation. However, individuals in the majority faction actually participate
less in the deliberation than individuals in the minority faction, perhaps because there are more
members of the majority faction to contribute to the group discussion. In other words, as the size
of the faction increases, the participation of each individual in the faction decreases (Hastie et al.,
1983b; Hawkins, 1960).
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5.3.4

Participation and Deliberation Style
Participation was related to deliberation style – a jury-level factor. At the juror-level, the

participation of individual jurors varied according to deliberation style. A verdict-driven
deliberation style was associated with more participation, even after controlling for length. This
finding is contrary to what would be expected based on the previous literature. In general, high
levels of participation and wide-ranging discussions highlighting case facts, evidence, and
judicial instructions are characteristic of evidence-driven deliberations. Verdict-driven
deliberations tend to include early and frequent polling, more pressure to conform to the
majority, and an increased likelihood of a hung jury (Devine et al., 2007; Hannaford-Agor et al.,
2002; Hastie et al., 1983b). In the current study, even juries that began with a poll included a
fairly detailed discussion of evidence favoring the point of view of both the majority and the
minority. In other words, although verdict-driven juries were longer and characterized by
increased participation, the type of evidence discussed during the deliberation did not differ
according to deliberation style.
5.4

What Factors Are Associated with Verdict Change?

5.4.1

Participation in the Deliberation
Little research has been conducted to examine verdict change in the deliberation.

Findings from the persuasion and attitude change literature suggest that examining the
characteristics of the communicators, the verdict changers, and the context may provide some
insight into which jurors change their verdict and why (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 2007; Kraus,
1995; Lavine et al., 1997; Marcus et al., 2000; Petty et al., 1997; Pornpitakpan, 2004;
Shestowsky & Horowitz, 2004; Snyder, 1979; Strodtbeck et al., 1957). Other social
psychological theories such as the social identity approach would suggest that verdict change
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may not be solely a function of compliance or persuasion, but may also be due to in-group norms
that dictate context-specific attitudes and behaviors appropriate for group members (Smith &
Terry, 2003; Wood, 2000).
In the current study, changers were found to take fewer turns in the group deliberation
before taking into account jury-level predictor variables. At the jury level, changers and nonchangers did not differ in terms of participation in the group deliberation. Although contrary to
the original hypothesis, this finding is not too surprising given that individual minority faction
members actually participated more in the deliberation than individual majority faction members.
Most changers were in the initial minority faction and may have been one of the only group
members representing the minority point of view. Evidence in support of both the prosecution
and the defense was discussed equally overall, indicating that both points of view were
represented in the deliberations. Changers had the opportunity to express their opinion, and most
(84.7%) indicated that they changed their opinion only after discussing the evidence with the
group.
5.4.2

Confidence in Pre-Deliberation Verdict
Changers did not differ from non-changers in their confidence in their individual pre-

deliberation verdicts. Diamond and Casper (1992) had previously found that individual jurors
who changed their verdict following deliberation expressed significantly less confidence in their
pre-deliberation verdicts than non-changers. The Diamond and Casper study involved a civil
case and a sample of potential jurors collected at the county courthouse during one session. The
current study involved an ambiguous criminal case, and the deliberation took place after a delay
of one to two weeks, on average. In the current study, jurors were generally confident in their
original verdict preference. Very few individual jurors reported that they were unsure about their
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initial verdict preference (8.1%). The majority of jurors (67.5%) reported that they were
confident or very confident in their initial verdict preference. The remaining jurors (24.2%)
reported being neutral. However, confidence decreases over time (Krishnan & Smith, 1998).
Mock jurors may originally express a certain degree of confidence in their chosen verdict when
the trial evidence is fresh in their mind. But, after a delay, their confidence may weaken as they
recall both their original verdict and why they reached that decision. Future research examining
individuals who change their verdict during the deliberation should continue to look at
differences in confidence in the pre-deliberation verdict.
5.4.3

Confidence in the Group Decision
Although changers and non-changers did not differ in their confidence in their pre-

deliberation individual verdicts, changers were less confident in their groups’ final verdicts.
Jurors may concede to the group opinion, but not necessarily personally agree with this decision.
This may explain why changers are less confident in the group decision. When only examining
groups that reached a decision, 22.4% of jurors stated that they did not personally agree with
their group’s decision. Similarly, Hans (2007) reported that, in a sample of actual jurors, 13% of
jurors said that, if the decision were up to them alone, they would have reached a different final
verdict from their jury. In analyzing the same data set, Waters and Hans (2009) found that 38%
of juries in the sample included at least one juror who would have reached an individual verdict
different from the group verdict.
5.5

When Can the Minority Prevail?

5.5.1

Normative and Informational Influence
In a recent review of the field, Bornstein and Greene (2011) point out that little is known

about how individual verdict preferences “are translated into a group decision, including the
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extent to which the majority exerts normative and/or informational influence over minority
jurors” (p. 65). The current study makes a contribution to this gap in our understanding. First, the
current study demonstrated that changers and non-changers do not differ significantly in their
participation in the jury deliberation, when taking jury-level factors into account. That is, nonchangers do not dominate the discussion. Further, only 13.2% of non-changers reported that they
felt coerced to change to the majority opinion. The vast majority of changers (82.1%) reported
that they changed their verdict after discussing the evidence with other jurors. Although it is
good news that the majority of jurors do not report pressure, it is still apparent that normative
influence factors into the jury deliberation. Even Henry Fonda’s character in 12 Angry Men was
willing to give in to the majority’s opinion if no one else would agree with him after an hour’s
discussion (Hans, 2007).
Stasser et al. (1984) found that informational rather than normative influence was a
stronger predictor of the final outcome in a deliberation. Offering more arguments, not
necessarily the sheer size of the faction, was the basis for the majority’s victory. In the current
study, there were no differences in the number of pro-prosecution and pro-defense facts in
evidence discussed based on the initial distribution of pre-deliberation individual verdict
preferences, although descriptive analyses suggested that jurors interpreted general facts in
evidence differently. Further, juries that ultimately rendered a verdict in favor of conviction
discussed more pro-prosecution evidence than juries that voted for acquittal or were hung.
Future research is necessary to understand under which conditions informational or
normative influence are more likely to affect the final verdict outcome. For example, how does
perceived credibility of the other jurors factor into the decision to change? Which jurors are more
likely to be influential during the deliberation?
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5.5.2

Perceptions of Influence
Decades of research have established that the distribution of individual jurors’ pre-

deliberation verdict preferences is a strong predictor of final verdict, as was the case in the
current study. However, research has not yet shown “what makes the majority position so
influential or the circumstances under which minorities are likely to prevail” (Salerno &
Diamond, 2010, p. 174). Analyzing jurors’ perceptions of one another could provide some
insight into why the majority faction prevails so often, and why the minority faction occasionally
has the power to convert the majority.
In a social relations analysis examining actual jurors’ perceptions of their groups, Marcus
et al. (2000) determined that the most striking finding of their study was “just how little
consensus there was among the participants about which jurors were influential” (p. 183). In the
current study, changers actually rated themselves as more influential during the group
deliberation than non-changers rated themselves. It is possible that changers believed that, by
initially representing an alternate point of view, they influenced the deliberation by encouraging
a wider discussion of the evidence. Although changers perceive themselves to be influential,
other jurors may not agree. More research is necessary to understand jurors’ perceptions of one
another, and how these perceptions influence what is discussed, what is listened to, and the final
decision of the group.
The majority-minority distinction, as used in group decision making studies, refers to an
individual’s preference status, which is based on the numerical size of the subgroup that shares
that preference (Kameda, Ohtsubo, &Takezawa, 1997). In addition to preference status, Kameda
and colleagues (Kameda, Takigku, & Ohtsubo, 1994, as cited in Kameda et al., 1997; Kameda et
al., 1997) have examined how shared information and cognitive centrality affect group decision
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making. Similar to the work on “hidden profiles” by Stasser (e.g., Stasser, 1992; Stasser & Titus,
1985), Kameda et al. (1994) examined group members who share the most information with
other group members. In their mock jury study, mock jurors in the majority faction who shared
the same cognitive orientation for organizing trial facts (“story organization” or “witness
organization”) dominated the group decision making process. In a later study, Kameda et al.
(1997) looked specifically at group members who were perceived to be the most knowledgeable
based on information overlap, termed cognitive centrality, with the most other group members.
The researchers found that the group members who were perceived to be the most cognitively
central were the most influential in forming the final group decision, even if their initial
preference status was in the numerical minority.
5.5.3

Participation of the Minority Faction
Research by Kameda and colleagues (Kameda et al., 1994; Kameda et al., 1997) suggests

that, if individuals in the minority faction have the opportunity to express their opinions and are
perceived as knowledgeable, they can be influential when they bring up information to challenge
the majority point of view (also see Moscovici, 1985). In fact, Clark (1990) showed that the
minority faction becomes more influential as it is able to refute more arguments made by the
majority faction. In the current study, individual minority faction members actually participated
in the group deliberation to a greater extent than individual majority faction members. Evidence
consistent with the initial viewpoint of the minority also was discussed during the deliberation to
the same extent as evidence consistent with the initial viewpoint of the majority.
The participation of minority faction members is increased under the unanimous decision
rule (Hastie et al., 1983a), which was employed in the current study. The courts have, at times,
questioned the necessity of a unanimous decision rule because “a majority will cease discussion
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and outvote a minority only after reasoned discussion has ceased to have persuasive effect or to
serve any other purpose” (Justice White, 1972, United States Supreme Court in Johnson v.
Louisiana). Empirical evidence has shown that a non-unanimous decision rule can undermine
attention to minority arguments (Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt, & Meek, 1975; Diamond, Rose, &
Murphy, 2006; Nemeth, 1977; Salerno & Diamond, 2010). Consistent with past research, the
current study further supports the notion that the opinions of the minority faction should be
valued.
5.6

Why Do Juries Hang?
Hung juries offer an interesting study of when groups cannot come to a consensus. The

option to declare a jury hung makes juries different from other decision making groups (Sanders
& Bonito, 2010). Most groups are required to produce an end result; juries are just required to
demonstrate a genuine effort. Hung juries are most likely to occur in cases where the predeliberation verdict preferences are deeply divided (Abramson, 2007; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966).
That is, cases with a strong initial majority favoring either conviction or acquittal rarely hang. In
the current study, all of the juries with a strong majority favoring either conviction or acquittal
rendered group verdicts that reflected that majority’s preference.
In the current study, six juries (16.2%) could not come to a unanimous decision. Kalven
and Zeisel (1966) reported that about 5.5% of their sample of 225 jury trials ended in a hung
jury. More recent reports (Abramson, 2007; Hannaford-Agor et al., 2002; Vidmar & Hans, 2007)
estimate that approximately 6.2% of juries result in no verdict in state courts and approximately
2.5% in federal courts. Mock jury studies typically find a much higher percentage of hung juries
than would be expected based on state and federal court estimates, with an estimated 21% of
mock juries failing to reach a verdict (Devine et al., 2001). The time restraints and other
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limitations of the mock jury paradigm may explain this discrepancy. While future studies would
benefit from providing a longer deliberation period, it may be unrealistic to expect mock jurors
from a student sample to participate in a deliberation lasting more than a couple of hours. On
average, the hung juries in the current sample deliberated for 38.05 minutes (2,283.17 seconds),
with a median of 37.89 (2,272.50 seconds) and a range of 7.95 minutes (477.00 seconds) to
62.81 minutes (3,769.00 seconds). Although juries that were declared hung deliberated
significantly longer on average than juries that reached a decision, most hung juries still did not
deliberate for the full amount of time allotted. Students in mock juries that ended in a hung
verdict seemed to grow frustrated early on by their group’s indecision. Future studies should
examine the point at which the deliberation appears to have reached a stalemate in the mock jury
context, and if, given a longer period of time, this can be overcome.
5.7

Limitations and Future Directions
Researchers studying the jury deliberation are faced with a myriad of challenges. The

ecological validity of simulation research, such as the current study, is often called into question
(Bornstein, 1999; Diamond, 1997; Wiener, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2011). Researchers have long
called for implementing strategies to enhance the quality of jury simulation studies (e.g., Vidmar,
1979; Weiten & Diamond, 1979). Studies using college samples, written transcripts, juror-level
verdicts, and no deliberation process have been viewed as more limited (Bornstein, 1999; Bray &
Kerr, 1982; Diamond, 1997; Nuñez et al., 2011; Vidmar, 1979; Weiten & Diamond, 1979).
Conducting jury simulation research is difficult enough, even before implementing these types of
changes.
Diamond (1997) and Bornstein (1999) have tried to determine whether creating more
“realistic” simulations influences study results. Bornstein (1999) focused primarily on examining
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validity issues pertaining to sample characteristics and trial medium, because these are two of the
most criticized aspects of jury simulation research (e.g., Bray & Kerr, 1982; Davis et al., 1977;
Diamond, 1997; Konecni & Ebbesen, 1979). After examining the extant literature in the field,
Bornstein concluded that few differences have been found “as a function of either who the mock
jurors are or how the mock trial is presented” (p. 88). Although the current study is limited in
that it includes a student sample and a written trial stimulus, it should not be assumed that these
findings would differ significantly from more complicated and time-intensive techniques.
Further, concerning trial medium, Diamond (1997) noted that abbreviated trial stimuli may be
appropriate in studies examining decision making processes in the deliberation.
One limitation of particular relevance to the current study is the finding that college
student samples may be more likely to give in to normative pressure from peers (Sears, 1986). If
students are indeed more likely to yield to normative pressure, the power of the initial majority in
reaching a unanimous verdict consistent with the majority’s original opinion may be inflated in
mock jury studies including student samples. Although researchers have noted few differences
between student and community samples in final verdict outcomes (Bornstein, 1999; Casper,
Benedict, & Perry, 1989; Diamond, 1997; Hosch, Culhane, Tubb, & Granillo, 2011) and the
finding that the majority rules is quite robust across field and laboratory studies (Devine et al.,
2001; Stasser et al., 1982), future research would benefit from specifically examining differences
in deliberation processes for different types of samples.
This study is also limited by the use of five- and six-person mock juries instead of the
traditional 12. Saks and Marti (1997) found that, although six- and 12-person mock juries did not
differ significantly in their final verdict outcomes, individuals in six-person mock juries were
able to participate more in the group discussion. Future studies would benefit from examining
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participation in 12-person mock juries. It would be interesting to see if individual minority
faction members continue to participate more than individual majority faction members in a
larger group setting.

Even if a jury simulation manages to reflect the sample and procedure as accurately as
possible, a simulation will always be limited in that the group’s decision lacks real world
consequences. All decision making, even real world decision making, can be viewed as
hypothetical at some level (Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 2002); however, the fact
that mock juries reach hypothetical decisions has been an impediment to the use of psychological
research by the courts (Free v. Peters, 1993; Lockhart v. McCree, 1986).
In a review of the literature examining consequentiality, Bornstein and MacCabe (2005)
summarized five studies in which consequentiality was examined and found inconsistent results:
“One study found that convictions were less likely when the decision had real consequences, one
study found that convictions were more likely when the decision had real consequences, one
study found no difference between real and hypothetical decisions, and the two remaining studies
found no main effect of consequentiality but obtained interacting effects with other variables” (p.
452). In other words, there is no consensus as to how the lack of consequentiality affects the
outcomes in jury simulation research. Bornstein and MacCabe concluded that, as always, more
research is necessary to understand how serious this limitation is to the applicability of jury
simulation research.
MacCoun (2005) suggested that a primary difference between mock and real jurors is that
real jurors may “think harder, deliberate longer, and ponder more deeply” (p. 513). He further
noted that even field methods are not without criticism, highlighting the importance of
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“triangulation across fallible sources of evidence” (p. 517) by continuing to pursue jury
simulation research in addition to field methods.
Every study of jury decision making ends with a long discussion of the limitations. It is
true that mock jury research is limited. As discussed above, the current study relied on a college
sample, a written trial transcript, and included no real world consequences for the final decision.
But despite these limitations, the underlying human processes that influence group decision
making still remain the same. Whether college students or community members or actual jurors,
individuals bring their own distinct ideas, opinions, attitudes, and personalities into the group
setting that must be reconciled into one final decision. Some individuals will be leaders, some
will be changers, some will dominate the discussion, and some will give way to group pressure.
This is human nature, well established by decades of psychological research. Although
limitations should be recognized and noted, research examining the processes by which a set of
individuals comes to one group decision can be useful in shedding a little more light on what
happens behind the closed doors of the jury deliberation.

In a comprehensive review of 206 deliberating groups, Devine et al. (2001) found four
categories of study: procedural characteristics, participant characteristics, case characteristics,
and deliberation characteristics. Most of the studies highlighted in their review focused on one or
more of the first three categories; few studies, even among those studies that included a
deliberation component, examined characteristics of the deliberation process. Perhaps this gap in
the field stems from Kalven and Zeisel’s (1966) assertion that the deliberation had little effect on
verdict outcome. Or perhaps this limitation stems from the absence of an “overarching
theoretical model” (Devine et al., 2001, p. 625). The current study began with the notion that
jury decision making cannot be fully understood without considering the group deliberation. In
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examining the deliberation process under a combined theoretical approach, this study offered
some insight into how the deliberation helps shape the final group decision and provided some
direction for future areas of study. QED
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TABLE 1
Juror-Level Frequencies and Descriptive Statistics
Frequency

Percent

Gender
Man
Woman

81
118

40.5
59.5

Self-Reported Ethnicity
African American
Asian
Non-Hispanic White
Hispanic
Native American
Other

4
3
23
162
3
2

1.9
1.4
10.6
75.0
1.4
0.9

Individual Verdict
Conviction
Acquittal

102
97

51.3
48.7

Initial Faction in Deliberation
Majority Faction
Minority Faction

147
62

68.4
28.8

M
22.87

SD
4.98

Age
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TABLE 2
Jury-Level Descriptive Statistics
95% CI
Jury-Level Variable (n = 37)

M (SEM)

LL

UL

Length of Deliberation in Minutes
Strong Majority Conviction (n = 7)
Weak Majority Conviction (n = 12)
Strong Majority Acquittal (n = 7)
Weak Majority Acquittal (n = 11)

18.56 (2.52)
14.10 (3.28)
22.83 (5.15)
12.62 (4.59)
20.50 (5.20)

13.44
6.06
11.49
1.38
8.91

23.67
22.14
34.17
23.85
32.10

Majority Faction Time in Minutes
Strong Majority Conviction (n = 7)
Weak Majority Conviction (n = 12)
Strong Majority Acquittal (n = 7)
Weak Majority Acquittal (n = 11)

10.30 (1.36)
8.60 (2.39)
12.21 (2.95)
7.27 (2.21)
11.24 (2.95)

7.53
2.74
6.33
1.86
4.67

13.07
14.45
18.08
12.67
17.81

Minority Faction Time in Minutes
Strong Majority Conviction (n = 7)
Weak Majority Conviction (n = 12)
Strong Majority Acquittal (n = 7)
Weak Majority Acquittal (n = 11)

5.72 (1.12)
2.67 (0.80)
8.09 (2.67)
3.43 (1.64)
6.53 (1.96)

3.44
0.73
2.21
-0.59
2.16

7.99
4.62
13.97
7.44
10.89

Majority Faction Number of Turns
Strong Majority Conviction (n = 7)
Weak Majority Conviction (n = 12)
Strong Majority Acquittal (n = 7)
Weak Majority Acquittal (n = 11)

145.46 (16.30)
138.29 (28.95)
167.50 (160.28)
121.57 (41.50)
141.18 (29.50)

112.40
67.45
95.73
20.03
75.45

178.52
209.12
239.27
223.11
206.91

Minority Faction Number of Turns
Strong Majority Conviction (n = 7)
Weak Majority Conviction (n = 12)
Strong Majority Acquittal (n = 7)
Weak Majority Acquittal (n = 11)

73.76 (12.36)
37.23 (8.64)
107.08 (42.12)
44.71 (4.12)
79.00 (33.86)

48.68
16.29
42.12
4.12
33.86

98.93
58.56
172.05
85.31
124.14

Majority Faction Modified Word Count
Strong Majority Conviction (n = 7)
Weak Majority Conviction (n = 12)
Strong Majority Acquittal (n = 7)
Weak Majority Acquittal (n = 11)

1,666.30 (230.32)
1,335.43 (395.31)
2,009.25 (501.54)
1,141.29 (346.29)
1,836.82 (441.37)

1,199.19
368.15
905.37
293.96
853.39

2,133.41
2,302.71
3,113.13
1,988.62
2,820.25
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Minority Faction Modified Word Count
Strong Majority Conviction (n = 7)
Weak Majority Conviction (n = 12)
Strong Majority Acquittal (n = 7)
Weak Majority Acquittal (n = 11)

957.35 (188.43)
427.29 (154.19)
1,349.58 (440.57)
524.86 (250.19)
1,142.00 (337.75)

Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
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575.20
50.00
379.90
-87.34
389.45

1,339.51
804.58
2,319.26
1,137.06
1,894.55

TABLE 3
Length of Deliberation by Distribution of Individual Verdict Preferences, Deliberation Style, and Final Outcome
95% CI
Length of Deliberation in Minutes
at the Jury Level (n = 37)

M (SEM)

LL

UL

Distribution
Strong Majority Conviction (n = 7)
Weak Majority Conviction (n = 12)
Strong Majority Acquittal (n = 7)
Weak Majority Acquittal (n = 11)

14.10 (3.28)
22.83 (5.15)
12.62 (4.59)
20.50 (5.20)

6.06
11.49
1.38
8.91

22.14
34.17
23.85
32.10

Deliberation Style
Verdict-Driven (n = 25)
Evidence-Driven (n = 12)

21.16 (3.39)
13.12 (2.82)

14.17
6.91

28.16
19.34

Final Outcome
Conviction (n = 12)

14.21 (2.06)a,b

9.68

18.73

Acquittal (n = 19)

15.15 (3.17)a

8.49

21.81

b

18.46

57.65

Hung (n = 6)

38.05 (7.62)

Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
and b represent significant contrast comparisons.

a
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TABLE 4
Group Outcome by Initial Distribution of Pre-Deliberation Verdict Preferences

Jury-Level Outcome

Conviction

Initial Distribution of Pre-Deliberation Verdict Preference
Strong Majority Conviction Weak Majority Conviction Strong Majority Acquittal

Weak Majority Acquittal

7 (18.9%)

4 (10.8%)

0 (0.0%)

1 (2.7%)

Acquittal

0 (0.0%)

5 (13.5%)

7 (18.9%)

7 (18.9%)

Hung

0 (0.0%)

3 (8.1%)

0 (0.0%)

3 (8.1%)

χ2(6) = 25.01**
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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TABLE 5
Group Decision by Initial Distribution of Pre-Deliberation Verdict Preferences

Jury-Level Decision

Conviction
Acquittal

Initial Distribution of Pre-Deliberation Verdict Preference
Strong Majority Conviction Weak Majority Conviction Strong Majority Acquittal

Weak Majority Acquittal

7 (22.6%)

4 (12.9%)

0 (0.0%)

1 (3.2%)

0 (0.0%)

5 (16.1%)

7 (22.6%)

7 (22.6%)

χ2(3) = 17.95**
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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TABLE 6
Representative Case Facts for Emergent Themes from Facts in Evidence Discussed During the Deliberation
Frequency
(across
juries)

Percent
of Juries

Similar car

24

65.8

2.03

1.00

0-10

"But the coincidence that within that small area there in a similar car?"

Car was not an exact match
Witness recalled similar license
plate number
License plate description not
completely accurate

13

35.9

0.46

0.00

0-2

20

54.1

1.22

1.00

0-7

"Honestly, to pinpoint him for it – no one even saw who it was. Just to
pinpoint because he drove that car…"
"The license plates were really close too."

19

51.4

0.78

1.00

0-3

"It’s just the first two letters out of six."

23

62.2

1.7

1.00

0-6

"He had the approximate exact amount of money that was missing."

13

35.1

0.59

0.00

0-5

"First of all, wasn't it like a wad of money? Why was the extra money there?
He had extra money."

32

86.5

3.24

2.00

0-13

26

70.3

1.95

1.00

0-9

"The old lady couldn't identify the watch, either."

12

32.4

0.73

0.00

0-7

"There was no engraving, which is why she could not tell if it was the exact
one."

31

83.8

3.24

2.00

0-15

33

89.2

3.38

2.00

0-14

"Those tools could be used for robbery."

31

83.8

4.19

3.00

0-18

"That is why I am bothered. The whole reasonable doubt thing. They did not
present beyond a reasonable doubt that he did do it."

20

54.1

1.86

1.00

0-15

Example of Representative Facts in
Evidence for Each Theme

Mean
(per
jury)

Median
(per
jury)

Range
(per
jury)

Characteristic Response

Car

Money
Defendant was found with an
amount of money similar to the
amount stolen
Defendant had a different amount
of money to the amount stolen
Watch
Defendant was found with a watch
similar to the one stolen
The victim could not positively
identify the watch
The watch was not engraved
Other Defendant Characteristics
Defendant was reported to be
intoxicated
Defendant was found with tools
Beyond Facts in Evidence
Reasonable doubt

Girlfriend was not a witness

"And then searching the car and then finding a similar watch…"

"He was intoxicated. That was big."

"If he was really at his girlfriend's house, he should have had her there."
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TABLE 7
Summary of Intercorrelations, Means, Medians, and Ranges for Juror-Level Participation
Juror-Level Variables (n = 216)

1

2

3

1. Length of Deliberation in
Minutes

1.00

2. Spoken Time in Minutes

.65**

1.00

3. Number of Turns

.60**

.86**

1.00

4. Modified Word Count

.66**

.99***

.89**

M
(SEM)

18.81
(1.04)

2.75
(0.24)

Median

12.63

1.46

Range

3.01 to
62.82

0 to 25.23

*p < .05l **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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37.60
(2.60)
26

0 to 263

4

1.00
449.70
(40.47)
239

0 to 4,675

TABLE 8
Descriptive Statistics for Jury-Level Participation

Jury-Level Variable (n = 37)
Time in Minutes
Majority Faction
Minority Faction

M (SEM)

Mean Difference

10.30 (1.36)
5.72 (1.12)

Number of Turns
Majority Faction
Minority Faction

145.46 (16.30)
73.76 (12.36)

Modified Word Count
Majority Faction
Minority Faction

1,666.30 (230.32)
957.35 (188.43)

Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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95% CI for Mean Difference
LL
UL

4.58**

2.87

6.30

71.70**

50.94

92.46

708.95**

430.45

987.44

TABLE 9
Fixed Effects Estimates for Models of Juror-Level Participation

Parameter

Model 1 (Null Model)

Model 2 (Juror-Level Model)

Model 3 (Jury-Level Model)

Estimate

95% CI

Estimate

95% CI

Estimate

95% CI

DV Index 1 (time)

163.45* (23.13)

[116.60, 210.30]

127.11* (28.3)

[72.17, 182.60]

88.09* (34.25)

[2.72, 155.47]

DV Index 2 (turn)

37.41* (4.42)

[28.46, 46.35]

27.36* (4.87)

[17.80, 36.93]

18.72* (7.26)

[4.33, 33.11]

446.04* (65.24)

[313.90, 578.19]

318.37* (72.92)

[175.34, 461.40]

190.01* (93.95)

[5.31, 374.71]

Majority*Index 1

61.56* (25.84)

[10.90, 112.22]

56.38* (28.74)

[-0.27, 113.03]

Majority*Index 2

12.30** (4.39)

[3.67, 20.93]

11.46* (4.67)

[2.27, 20.66]

Majority*Index 3

194.68** (70.40)

[56.22, 333.15]

179.88* (76.61)

[28.90, 330.85]

28.09 (26.13)

[-23.15, 79.34]

18.91 (28.86)

[-37.95, 75.77]

Level 1 (Null Model)

DV Index 3 (mwc)
Level 2 (Juror-Level)

Change*Index 1
Change*Index 2

9.58* (4.47)

[0.79, 18.37]

7.90 (4.74)

[-1.44, 17.25]

Change*Index 3

107.28 (71.17)

[-32.22, 246.79]

78.58 (76.91)

[-72.91, 230.08]

70.31* (31.86)

[7.62, 133.00]

Level 3 (Jury-Level)
Style*Index 1
Style*Index 2

14.96 (7.66)

[-0.32, 30.23]

Style*Index 3

227.67** (89.13)

[52.62, 402.73]

-2*log likelihood
χ2diff

7,280.11

7,263.67

7,236.16

16.44

43.95*

Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Length is included in the jury-level model as a covariate. Majority = indication if the participant was in the majority or minority faction;
Change = indication of whether the participant changed verdict during deliberation; Style = deliberation style.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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TABLE 10
Estimated Marginal Means for Juror-Level Participation Variables from the Full Multilevel Model
95% CI
Juror-Level Variable (n = 216)

M (SEM)

LL

UL

Time in Minutes
In Majority Faction (n = 151)
In Minority Faction (n = 64)
Change in Verdict (n = 68)
No Change in Verdict (n = 145)

2.68 (0.28)
2.21 (0.32)
3.15 (0.41)
2.52 (0.40)
2.84 (0.34)

2.13
1.57
2.34
1.74
2.16

3.24
2.85
3.96
3.30
3.51

Number of Turns
In Majority Faction (n = 151)
In Minority Faction (n = 64)
Change in Verdict (n = 68)
No Change in Verdict (n = 145)

35.88 (3.94)
30.15 (4.24)
41.62 (4.90)
31.93 (4.80)
39.84 (4.89)

28.40
21.74
31.94
22.44
31.14

43.73
38.57
51.29
41.43
48.53

Modified Word Count
In Majority Faction (n = 151)
In Minority Faction (n = 64)
Change in Verdict (n = 68)
No Change in Verdict (n = 145)

470.07 (47.07)
343.14 (53.56)
523.02 (67.07)
393.76 (64.76)
472.37 (56.53)

340.60
237.87
391.07
266.42
361.24

525.55
448.41
654.96
521.15
583.50

Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. Deliberation length is controlled. Means are adjusted to account for
correlations among dependent variables.
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TABLE 11
Fixed Effects Estimates for Models of Juror-Level Confidence in Group Verdict

Model 1 (Null Model)
Parameter
Intercept

Model 2 (Juror-Level Model)

Model 3 (Jury-Level Model)

Estimate

95% CI

Estimate

95% CI

Estimate

95% CI

3.77 (0.09)

[3.57, 3.96]

3.54 (0.12)

[3.31, 3.77]

3.77 (0.19)

[3.39, 4.15]

0.34 (0.10)**

[0.14, 0.53]

0.34 (0.10)**

[0.14, 0.54]

0.01 (0.20)

[-0.39, 0.41]

0.00 (0.00)*

[0.00, 0.00]

Level 1 (Juror-Level)
Change
Level 2 (Jury-Level)
Style
Length
-2*log likelihood

461.92

453.92

467.23

Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Length is included in the jury-level model as a covariate. Change = indication of whether the
participant changed verdict during deliberation; Style = deliberation style.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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TABLE 12
Estimated Marginal Means for Juror-Level Confidence in the Group Verdict from the Full Multilevel
Model
95% CI
Variable
Juror-Level

M (SEM)
Change in Verdict (n = 68)

LL

UL

3.54 (0.12)a

3.30

3.77

a

3.67

4.08

3.48
3.38

3.95
4.00

No Change in Verdict (n = 145)

3.88 (0.10)

Verdict-Driven (n = 25)
Evidence-Driven (n = 12)

3.71 (0.12)
3.70 (0.16)

Jury-Level

Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. Deliberation length is controlled.
a
represents significant contrast comparisons.

95

TABLE 13
Additional Descriptive Statistics about Verdict Changers
All Jurors (n = 216)

Frequency

Percent

Change Verdict During Deliberation
Yes

68

31.6

No

147

68.4

0

0.0

Somewhat Unsure

16

8.1

Neutral

48

24.2

118

59.6

16

8.1

3

1.5

12

5.9

Confidence in Individual Verdict
Very Unsure

Confident
Very Confident
Confidence in Group Verdict
Very Unsure
Somewhat Unsure
Neutral

42

20.6

118

57.8

29

14.2

Yes

160

74.8

No

48

22.4

Yes

5

8.3

No

55

91.7

Yes

27

39.7

No

41

60.3

Yes

37

54.4

No

28

41.2

Yes

48

70.6

No

20

29.4

Yes

9

13.2

No

59

86.8

Confident
Very Confident
Agree with Group Verdict

Changers Only (n = 68)
Changed Verdict Pre-Deliberation

I Changed to the Majority Decision

Others Brought Up Evidence I Forgot

Others Helped Me Rethink Evidence

I Felt Coerced by the Group to Change
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APPENDIX A
Detailed Descriptions of All Project Materials
Voir Dire Questionnaire
The voir dire questionnaire (see Appendix B) collected basic demographic information
(e.g., age, gender, jury eligibility, and ethnicity) about each participant. In addition, participants
were asked about connections to the legal system (e.g., “Do you have a close friend or family
member who is now or who has ever been law enforcement?”); past experiences with the police
(e.g., “Have you ever reported a crime to the police?”); and past experiences with the court
system (e.g., “Have you ever been a witness in a criminal case?”).
Participants’ attitudes about the legal system were assessed through the administration of
the Pretrial Juror Attitude Questionnaire (PJAQ; Lecci & Myers, 2008). The PJAQ is a 29-item
scale representing six underlying factors: conviction proneness (e.g., “Criminals should be
caught and convicted by any means necessary.”), system confidence (e.g., “When it is the
suspect’s word against the police officer’s, I believe the police.”), cynicism towards the defense
(e.g., “Lawyers will do whatever it takes, even lie, to win a case.”), social justice (e.g., “Rich
individuals are almost never convicted of their crimes.”), racial bias (e.g., “Minorities use the
race issue only when they are guilty.”), and innate criminality (e.g., “Once a criminal, always a
criminal.”).
Trial Transcript
Participants were asked to read a trial transcript (see Appendix C) that describes a
burglary of habitation trial. This transcript has previously been shown to produce nearly equal
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frequencies of convictions and acquittals. In the transcript, participants learn that a woman
arrives home to find that her residence has been burglarized and a specified amount of money
and a gold watch are missing. When questioned by the police, the woman provides a detailed
description of a vehicle she saw leaving her driveway. The defendant is found in his vehicle,
which matches the description, nearby the woman’s residence. When his vehicle is searched,
several watches and a large sum of money are found in addition to a toolbox containing tools
similar to those used in the burglary. The testimony and cross-examination of the victim, a police
officer, and the defendant are all presented in the transcript.
Individual Verdict Form
The verdict form (see Appendix D) asked participants to render an individual verdict of
either Guilty or Not-Guilty. Participants rated their confidence in their personal verdict decision
on a scale from 1 = “Very Unsure” to 5 = “Very Confident.” In addition, participants who
selected a verdict of guilty were asked to provide a sentencing recommendation in accordance
with Texas law.
Post Individual Verdict Questionnaire
The post individual verdict questionnaire (see Appendix E) was used to assess individual
participants’ interpretations of the evidence and opinions about trial participants. Participants
were asked to generate from memory a list of the facts in evidence. This list was presented as a
test of recall rather than of recognition in accordance with the findings of Snyder and Cantor
(1979) to ensure that participants were not cued by facts of evidence listed in a recognition task.
Participants ranked the facts recalled in order of most important to least important in forming
their verdict preference (e.g., 1 being most important, 2 being second most important, etc.).
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Finally, participants were asked to indicate whether each fact generated appeared to support the
prosecution or the defense or served as a general fact of the case (e.g., time of arrest).
As a rating of perceived strength of evidence (SOE), participants were asked to consider
the case as a whole and rate how strong they perceived the evidence against the defendant to be
overall. Participants rated the perceived SOE on 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = “Very Weak Case
against the Defendant” to 5 = “Very Strong Case against the Defendant”). Last, participants were
asked to rate the likeability and the perceived persuasiveness of all the trial participants: the
judge, the prosecuting attorney, the defense attorney, the victim, the defendant, and the witness
for the prosecution. Ratings of likeability were measured by a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 =
“Very Likeable” to 5 = “Very Unlikeable”). Similarly, perceived persuasiveness will be
measured by a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = “Very Persuasive” to 5 = “Not at all Persuasive”).
Group Decision Form and Post-Deliberation Group Questionnaire
The group decision form (see Appendix F) asked the participants in each mock jury to
reach a unanimous group verdict to find the defendant either Guilty or Not-Guilty. In addition,
mock juries in favor of conviction were asked to provide a sentencing recommendation in
accordance with Texas law.
The post-deliberation group questionnaire was used to assess the group’s use of the
evidence during the deliberation. All members of the group completed this form together
following the group decision. The group was provided with a checklist of the facts in evidence
and was asked to check all facts discussed during the deliberation. In addition, the group rated
each fact discussed as supporting the prosecution, the defense, or neither (i.e., neutral). As a
group, participants were asked to rate the strength of the evidence. The group was asked to
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consider the case as a whole and rate how strong they perceived the evidence against the
defendant to be overall. As in the individual form, participants rated the perceived SOE on 5point Likert-type scale (1 = “Very Strong Case against the Defendant” to 5 = “Very Weak Case
against the Defendant”). As in the individual questionnaire, the group also was asked to rate the
likeability and the perceived persuasiveness of all the trial participants: the judge, the prosecuting
attorney, the defense attorney, the victim, the defendant, and the witness for the prosecution.
Ratings of likeability were measured by a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = “Very Likeable” to 5 =
“Very Unlikeable”). Similarly, perceived persuasiveness was measured by a 5-point Likert-type
scale (1 = “Very Persuasive” to 5 = “Not at all Persuasive”).
Post-Deliberation Individual Questionnaire
Each individual mock juror completed a post-deliberation individual questionnaire
separately after the group deliberation (see Appendix H). Participants were asked to indicate
their group’s decision and their confidence in the group’s decision. Participants indicated their
personal verdict decision and whether they changed from their individual decision (as indicated
in the individual verdict form). Participants who changed from their initial verdict selection were
asked about their reasons for changing their position. Finally, participants answered a series of
questions about the group decision process. These questions included open-ended questions (e.g.,
“How would you describe the process that led to your group decision?”), self-ratings (e.g., “How
motivated were you to persuade group members to see things from your point of view?”), and
ratings of each other group members (e.g., “How similar is this person to you?”).
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APPENDIX B
Voir Dire Questionnaire
Demographic Information:
Age:

Gender:

Ethnicity:

Years Lived in El Paso:
Licensed Driver: Yes

No

Registered Voter: Yes

No

Marital Status: Married

Never Married

Divorced

Widowed

If Married: Years Married
If You Have Children: Number of Children:
Your Occupation and Employer:
Name of Last School or College Attended, Grade Completed, or Degree Received:

What is (was) the principal profession or vocation of your parents?
Father:

Mother:

Your religious preference (if any):

Experiences with the Legal System:
In this section, you will be asked some general questions about your personal experiences with
the legal system. Please answer these questions honestly. Again, please remember that these
answers are completely anonymous.
Have you served on a jury before? Yes
If yes, how many times?
Was it Civil
; Criminal
Was a verdict rendered? Yes

No
; Grand Jury

?

No

Are you now or have you ever been a law enforcement officer?
If yes, state what type and when:
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Yes

No

Do you have a close friend or relative who is now or ever has been a law enforcement officer?
Yes
No
If yes, state the nature of the relationship, type of law enforcement officer, and when the
individual was (is) a law enforcement officer:
Have you ever been a victim of a crime? Yes
No
If yes, state the nature of the crime and when it occurred:
Has any close friend or relative ever been the victim of a crime? Yes
If yes, state the nature of the crime and when it occurred:
Have you ever been a witness in a criminal case? Yes
If yes, state the type of case and when it occurred:

No

No

Overall, how do you feel about police officers?
-3
Very
Negative

-2

-1

0
Neutral

Have you ever spoken with a police officer? Yes
If yes, how many times?

1

2

No

Once or twice
A few times
Several times
Many times
If yes, in what contexts? (check all that apply)
Speeding ticket / traffic accident
Answering questions about something I had seen
Answering questions about something I may have done
Answering questions about something that happened to me
Talking about general issues or concerns such as safety
In a social context
Other (please explain)
Have you ever reported a crime to the police? Yes
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No

3
Very
Positive

Please answer the questions below based on the given scale.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree
nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
A defendant should be found guilty if 11 out of 12 jurors vote guilty.
Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
In most cases where the accused presents a strong defense, it is only because of a
good lawyer.
Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime with
which they are charged.
For serious crimes like murder, a defendant should be found guilty so long as
there is a 90% chance that he committed the crime.
Defense lawyers don’t really care about guilt or innocence, they are just in
business to make money.
Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who
committed the crime.
Many accident claims filed against insurance companies are phony.
The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Extenuating circumstances should not be considered; if a person commits a crime,
then that person should be punished.
If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of
marijuana, he should never be convicted.
Defense lawyers are too willing to defend individuals they know are guilty.
Police routinely lie to protect other police officers.
Once a criminal, always a criminal.
Lawyers will do whatever it takes, even lie, to win a case.
Criminals should be caught and convicted by “any means necessary.”
A prior record of conviction is the best indicator of a person’s guilt in the present
case.
Rich individuals are almost never convicted of their crimes.
If a defendant is a member of a gang, he/she is definitely guilty of the crime.
Minorities use the “race issue” only when they are guilty.
When it is the suspect’s word against the police officer’s, I believe the police.
Men are more likely to be guilty of crimes than are women.
The large number of African Americans currently in prison is an example of the
innate criminality of that group.
A black man on trial with a predominantly white jury will always be found guilty.
Minority suspects are likely to be guilty, more often than not.
If a witness refuses to take a lie detector test, it is because he/she is hiding
something.
Defendants who change their story are almost always guilty.
Famous people are often considered to be “above the law.”
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APPENDIX C
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF EL PASO, TEXAS
THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

THE STATE OF TEXAS

V.

MARCO ANTONIO MEDRANO

Prosecutor: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury at this point in time the State is going to explain
this case to you.
This is about a burglary of a habitation. The victim in this case is Ms. Mary Martin. Ms. Martin
is going to testify to you today and the State expects to show that she was returning home the
evening of January 10th about 8:45 in the evening when she observed a blue Ford Taurus leaving
her home. Shortly thereafter she entered her home and discovered that the house had been broken
into. She was missing a watch and a quantity in cash.
Ladies and gentlemen, the State also expects to bring Officer Bolick here to testify: to tell you
about his arrest of Mark Medrano; to tell you about the evidence he collected at the scene where
Mark Medrano was arrested.
Ladies and gentlemen after you hear the evidence presented by the State, the State is confident
you will find the Mark Medrano guilty of burglary of a habitation. Thank you very much.
Judge: The Defense may make its opening statement at this time.
Defense Attorney: May it please the Court, Mr. Arredondo {Prosecutor}, Mr. Medrano, and
ladies and gentlemen of the jury.
I anticipate that in this trial you will hear from several witnesses. I anticipate that you will hear
from Mary Martin, this is the homeowner. I anticipate that you will hear from Officer Howard
Bolick, the investigating officer, and I anticipate their testimony to be totally inconclusive and
full of reasonable doubt. I expect that you’ll find many inconsistencies in what these State
witnesses have to tell you. And based on those inconsistencies; I think some very crucial
inconsistencies; I’m going to ask that you return a finding of not guilty on behalf of Mr.
Medrano. Thank you.
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(Judge addresses Prosecutor.)
Judge: If you would call your first witness, please.
(Prosecutor addresses Judge.)
Prosecutor: Mary Martin to the stand.
(Judge addresses witness.)
Judge: You may approach the stand.
(Witness takes the stand. Judge addresses Prosecutor.)
Judge: Counsel, you may proceed with the direct examination.
Prosecutor: Thank you, your Honor.
Ma’am would you give us your full name please?
Mary Martin: Mary Martin.
Prosecutor: Let me take you back to January 10th. Did something unusual happen that day to
you?
Mary Martin: Yes, it did; that evening it did.
Prosecutor: What happened that evening?
Mary Martin: Well I came home and I noticed the door to my house was jimmied open.
Prosecutor: Okay. About what time was it that night?
Mary Martin: It was about 8:45 p.m.
Prosecutor: How do you know that was the time?
Mary Martin: Because I wanted to be home by 9 p.m., for sure inside the house, ready to watch
a TV program.
Prosecutor: Okay. Where were you that evening?
Mary Martin: At a friend of mine’s having Sunday supper.
Prosecutor: What is the name of your friend?
Mary Martin: Nancy Coolidge.
Prosecutor: Did you see anybody in your home?
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Mary Martin: No, I did not.
Prosecutor: Did you see anybody leaving your home?
Mary Martin: Yes, I did. Well I saw a car speeding away from my driveway, and there was
someone in the car driving away.
Prosecutor: Just one person in the car?
Mary Martin: To the best of my knowledge, yes. There was one person in the car.
Prosecutor: What kind of car?
Mary Martin: Yes. It was a blue 4-door sedan, probably a Sable, and I thought it was maybe 8
to 10 years old, and yes I noticed it had a little gray smudge or some kind of smudge on the right
front fender.
Prosecutor: Okay. You said it was just one person in the car?
Mary Martin: Yes. I think it was a man. I am not sure.
Prosecutor: Did you get a good look at this person?
Mary Martin: No, he was leaving too fast for me to get a good look.
Prosecutor: Did you get a look at the license plate?
Mary Martin: Well I did see part of it, it was like D as in “dog,” and it was D-D-C or D-D-X
Prosecutor: Okay. When this vehicle left the area what did you do?
Mary Martin: Well, I got out of my car and opened the door, and I looked at the jimmied door,
and I went to the other part of the house and went in. And what else did you want to know?
Prosecutor: Let me ask you about the jimmied door. What is it that you would describe as
being jimmied?
Mary Martin: It was like pried open I think that would be it.
Prosecutor: That was your front door?
Mary Martin: Yes.
Prosecutor: Had you locked that front door that day?
Mary Martin: Yes.
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Prosecutor: Who else lives in the house with you?
Mary Martin: No one.
Prosecutor: How long have you been living in that home?
Mary Martin: 15 years.
Prosecutor: Have you always lived there alone?
Mary Martin: No, I have not.
Prosecutor: Who else lived with you?
Mary Martin: My husband.
Prosecutor: Where is your husband right now?
Mary Martin: He’s no longer with us; he’s dead.
Prosecutor: When did he pass away?
Mary Martin: Five years ago.
Prosecutor: So you have been living alone for five years?
Mary Martin: Yes, I’ve been a widow for five years and living alone.
Prosecutor: When you entered the house, did you see anything was taken?
Mary Martin: Did I see anything taken? Yes. I noticed some drawers that were askew, and
things were falling out of them, I looked at the skewed drawers. So I looked at drawers where I
had a box… Is that what you mean?
Prosecutor: Yes, ma’am.
Mary Martin: And in one box there had been 252 dollars. I knew that was the amount because
I had that earmarked to go to the bank on Monday, which was the next day. And there was
another box which had some silver cufflinks, they were still there, and then there was my
husband’s gold watch and it was missing; a watch and the money.
Prosecutor: Okay. Did you call the police that evening?
Mary Martin: Yes.
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Prosecutor: And did they respond?
Mary Martin: Yes, they did, very quickly. They came in 20 minutes; they were fairly near to
me.
Prosecutor: Do you know the officer’s name?
Mary Martin: No I don’t. I know what he looks like, I could identify him, but I forget the
name.
Prosecutor: Did you give the officer a description of the car you saw that night?
Mary Martin: Yes, I did.
Prosecutor: And your description of the partial license plate that you remember?
Mary Martin: Yes, I did.
Prosecutor: Did you give a description of what was missing that night?
Mary Martin: Yes, of course.
(Prosecutor addresses Judge)
Prosecutor: Your Honor may I approach the Mary Martin?
Judge: Yes, you may.
(Prosecutor shows Mary Martin a gold watch.)
Prosecutor: I’m handing you a watch. Take a look at this please. Do you recognize this watch?
Mary Martin: It looks exactly like my husband’s watch, I can’t be sure it is that watch, but it
looks exactly like it.
Prosecutor: Okay. Did you give anybody permission to enter your home that night?
Mary Martin: Oh no.
Prosecutor: Did you give anybody permission to take any money or that watch from you?
Mary Martin: No, of course not.
(Prosecutor addresses Judge)
Prosecutor: At this time your Honor, the State is going to pass the Mary Martin.
(Judge addresses Defense Attorney)
Judge: Cross examination, please.
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Defense Attorney: Thank you, Judge. Ms. Martin I am the attorney representing Mr. Medrano,
and that is the young man who is seated here and who’s on trial for this matter. Do you
understand that it is crucial for you to be completely candid and truthful in your responses,
ma’am?
Mary Martin: Yes.
Defense Attorney: About this vehicle you’ve described, how far were you to the vehicle when
you first saw it, approximately?
Mary Martin: How far was the vehicle when I first saw it?
Defense Attorney: Yes, ma’am. What distance were you from the vehicle?
Mary Martin: Well, I’m not very good at estimating that, but about 20 to 25 feet, maybe from
here to where the jury box is.
Defense Attorney: Could it have been about as much as maybe a half of a regular block, a
neighborhood block, could it have been that distance, ma’am?
Mary Martin: Well, that depends on block; you mean where I live?
Defense Attorney: Yes, ma’am.
Mary Martin: A little closer.
Defense Attorney: What type of lighting exists out there on the street you live on?
Mary Martin: There is a street light near the end of the block and then a couple of the
neighbors have lights that light up their walkway, and the entrance to their driveways and a light
that lights up one of the walkways to our house. And a light that goes on and off when people go
into the drive and out.
Defense Attorney: Okay. Ma’am, isn’t it true that you did tell the officers and you testified here
in front of this jury that you never saw the person inside the car?
Mary Martin: Well, I saw a person. I don’t know what you mean by that.
Defense Attorney: You don’t remember the face of the person inside the car do you?
Mary Martin: No, that’s correct.
Defense Attorney: You don’t know if this person was a male or a female do you?
Mary Martin: That’s difficult to tell these days because some have men have long hair and
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some women have short hair, but no I couldn’t tell.
Defense Attorney: Well isn’t it true that you don’t know, you never described any distinctive
clothing or anything distinctive about the person that you say you saw driving that vehicle?
Mary Martin: No, I was paying more attention to the car.
Defense Attorney: Okay, and from a distance you’re describing, how many feet
would you say you were from this vehicle?
Mary Martin: Like I said before, maybe 20 feet, maybe less, but I could see the car.
Defense Attorney: And from that distance you’re saying you could see clearly the color of the
vehicle?
Mary Martin: I could see the color, and I could see part of the license plate because my brother
and I used to play games all the time about looking at license plates and cars so I’m used to
doing that still. It’s just a habit.
Defense Attorney: And you say you saw the letters either D-D-C or D-D-X is that right?
Mary Martin: Yes, I did.
Defense Attorney: May I approach the witness your Honor?
Judge: Yes, you may.
(Defense Attorney shows Mary Martin a watch.)
Defense Attorney: This is the watch that you describe as looking a lot like your late husband’s
watch is that right?
Mary Martin: That’s correct.
Defense Attorney: How long were you married?
Mary Martin: We were married for about 20 years.
Defense Attorney: Okay. But you’ve told the ladies and gentlemen of this jury you weren’t
absolutely sure that this was one and the same watch, isn’t this true?
Mary Martin: What I said was that it looks exactly like the watch that he had and that he wore,
but I can’t be absolutely certain. There are no initials on the back and the only identification is
that the watch looked exactly like this.
Defense Attorney: Then you would agree with me, ma’am, that this watch isn’t a one of a kind
watch, isn’t that true?
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Mary Martin: I don’t know, I assume it isn’t, but I’m not sure of that either.
Defense Attorney: Well, when your husband purchased this watch was it engraved or was there
anything distinctive about his watch that would separate it from any other watch?
Mary Martin: I don’t know because I don’t know where he bought it, so I don’t know if it’s
just one of a kind.
Defense Attorney: But you can tell you’re not absolutely sure that this is your husband’s watch,
isn’t that true, Ms. Martin?
Mary Martin: I just stated that because there are no initials on the back that this could be
someone else’s watch, but it looks exactly like his watch.
(Judge addresses Mary Martin)
Judge: Thank you, ma’am. You’re excused.
(Judge addresses Prosecutor.)
Judge: You may call your next witness.
Prosecutor: Howard Bolick to the stand.
(Judge addresses Officer.)
Judge: You may approach the stand.
(Officer takes the stand. Judge addresses Prosecutor.)
Judge: Counsel, you may proceed with the direct examination.
(Prosecutor addresses Judge.)
Prosecutor: Thank you, your Honor. Officer, can you give the ladies and gentlemen of the jury
your name please?
Officer: My name is Howard Bolick.
Prosecutor: Who are you employed with?
Officer: By the police department.
Prosecutor: How long have you been so employed?
Officer: Eleven years.
Prosecutor: What were your duties on January 10th of this year?
Officer: Routing patrol on the northeast part of the city.
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Prosecutor: Were you alone?
Officer: Yes, I was.
Prosecutor: Were you in uniform?
Officer: Yes.
Prosecutor: In a marked vehicle?
Officer: Yes.
Prosecutor: A vehicle with lights on top?
Officer: That is correct.
Prosecutor: Do you recall responding to a burglary call that evening?
Officer: Yes, at about 8:55 that evening I was dispatched to 9625 Goldwing.
Prosecutor: Did you obtain a report from Ms. Martin?
Officer: Yes, in reference to a burglary of a habitation.
Prosecutor: Did she give a description of a particular person?
Officer: She was unable to give a suspect description at that time as far as the person.
Prosecutor: Did you get any kind of description?
Officer: She did advise me that she had seen…
(Defense Attorney intercedes with an objection. Defense Attorney addresses Judge.)
Defense Attorney: I’m going to object on hearsay that this officer may have heard.
(Judge addresses Officer.)
Judge: You may state whether she gave you a description or if she did not give you a
description.
Officer: Okay, your Honor.
(Prosecutor continues.)
Prosecutor: Did she give any other description?
Officer: Yes, she did.
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Prosecutor: Was there an indication that things had been taken from the home?
Officer: Yes.
Prosecutor: Did you get a list of those things?
Officer: Yes.
Prosecutor: Did you make a subsequent arrest for this offense?
Officer: Yes, it was about 45 minutes later.
Prosecutor: Did you pull someone over? How did that go about?
Officer: After leaving her house, I was patrolling the area. About 45 minutes later I observed a
blue Ford Taurus with Texas license DDQ-384 as I drove by I observed there was a single male
inside the vehicle.
Prosecutor: What first drew your attention to this vehicle?
Officer: As I went by the vehicle, I observed there was one individual seated at the driver’s seat
as my patrol car went by he ducked down as if trying to avoid me.
Prosecutor: Did the description of the vehicle you just gave match the description given by Ms.
Martin?
Officer: Somewhat, it was a rough description.
Prosecutor: Okay. What did you do when you stopped?
Officer: When I stopped, I approached the vehicle after observing him duck down. I approached
from the rear of the vehicle; as I did so, I observed him with a 16 ounce can of Budweiser, which
he was drinking at the time.
Prosecutor: He was drinking, you observed him drinking?
Officer: Yes, I did.
Prosecutor: What did you do when you saw this?
Officer: At that time I shone my light on the car and ordered him out of the vehicle for my own
safety.
Prosecutor: At this point in time did you arrest the defendant?
Officer: No, not at that time.
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Prosecutor: Okay, but he had violated the law?
Officer: Yes, Sir, it was a municipal violation.
Prosecutor: What was the demeanor of the defendant?
Officer: It was my opinion that the defendant was intoxicated. I noticed that he had slurred
speech, bloodshot eyes, some difficulty standing, and staggered somewhat as he walked toward
me.
Prosecutor: Do you see the person which you stopped that evening here today?
Officer: Yes, at the Defense Attorney table.
Prosecutor: Let the record show that he has identified Mr. Medrano. At what point in time did
you connect Mr. Medrano with the burglary at Ms. Martin’s home?
Officer: Shortly after he stepped out of the vehicle, I realized the car did meet the description.
And also because he was intoxicated and drinking in public at that time I placed him under arrest
and continued the investigation believing he was involved in the burglary.
Prosecutor: Pursuant to this arrest, did you search Mr. Medrano’s vehicle?
Officer: I asked for his permission, and at that time he said, “Sure, I ain’t got nothing to hide.”
Prosecutor: Did you indeed go through the car?
Officer: Yes, Sir, I did.
Prosecutor: Did you find anything unusual in that car.?
Officer: Yes, Sir, in the front part of the car, I located three watches, one of them being the gold
Bulova watch.
(Prosecutor addresses Judge.)
Prosecutor: May I approach the witness?
Judge: Yes, you may.
(Prosecutor shows Officer three watches.)
Prosecutor: Sir, I am going to show you three watches, would you please take a good look at
them? Sir, do you recognize these watches from any place?
Officer: Yes, these are the watches I removed from the Mark Medrano’s vehicle.
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Prosecutor: How do you know these are the same ones that you recovered from the vehicle?
Officer: In accordant with department policy, they are all tagged with my initials, ID number,
and case number on the back.
Prosecutor: Okay, so they all have your ID number to show that they’re the same ones?
Officer: Yes.
(Prosecutor addresses Judge.)
Prosecutor: At this time the State moves to enter the watches into evidence.
(Judge addresses Defense Attorney.)
Judge: Any objections?
(Defense Attorney addresses Judge.)
Defense Attorney: Judge, I will object on basis that there is not a proper predicate or chain of
custody on these items and for those reasons we are objecting to their admission.
Judge: Overruled, the exhibits are admitted.
(Prosecutor addresses Officer.)
Prosecutor: So those are three watches that you recovered from the vehicle?
Officer: Yes, Sir, they are.
Prosecutor: Did you ever show those watches to Ms. Martin?
Officer: Yes, Sir, I did, about 30 minutes after I made the stop of the defendant.
Prosecutor: Was there identification made?
Officer: Yes, Sir, there was.
Prosecutor: To which one?
Officer: It would be to the gold Bulova watch.
Prosecutor: What did Ms. Martin state?
Officer: She stated that it appeared to be her husband's watch, her late husband’s watch.
Prosecutor: Did you find anything else in the vehicle?
Officer: Yes, Sir, when I looked in the trunk I noticed several tools, including a couple of
screwdrivers, crowbars, and a small garden tool.
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Prosecutor: How did you get into the trunk?
Officer: With the keys that the defendant provided
Prosecutor: The defendant provided you the keys?
(Prosecutor addresses Judge.)
Prosecutor: Your Honor, may I approach the witness?
Judge: Yes, you may.
(Prosecutor addresses Officer.)
Prosecutor: Officer, please take a look at these tools. Do you recognize them from anyplace?
Officer: Yes, Sir.
Prosecutor: Where do you recognize them from?
Officer: These are the tools I removed from the defendant’s vehicle.
Prosecutor: And they were located in the trunk of the vehicle?
Officer: Yes, Sir.
Prosecutor: How do you know these are the same tools that you located?
Officer: Again, they’re tagged in accordance to our procedures.
Prosecutor: What kind of tools do we have here?
Officer: They are general tools; however, they could also be used as burglary tools.
(Defense Attorney addresses Judge.)
Defense Attorney: Excuse me, Judge, I’m going to object that the witness is speculating as to
how these tools may or may not be used.
Judge: Predicate has not yet been laid for any knowledge. The objection is sustained at this
time.
(Prosecutor addresses Officer.)
Prosecutor: When you searched the defendant was there any money found on him?
Officer: Yes, Sir, he had 270 dollars in his pockets.
(Prosecutor addresses Judge.)
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Prosecutor: Your Honor, the State passes the witness.
(Judge addresses Defense Attorney.)
Judge: Cross examination.
Defense Attorney: Thank you, Judge.
(Defense Attorney addresses Officer.)
Defense Attorney: Officer Bolick, you can’t tell this jury who broke into Mary Martin’s house,
can you?
Officer: No, Sir, I can’t tell them exactly who.
Defense Attorney: Because you weren’t present, you didn’t see who did that, isn’t that right?
Officer: Exactly.
Defense Attorney: You described arresting my client initially because he was parked alongside
a roadway?
Officer: No, Sir, I arrested him because he was in violation of several municipal ordinances.
Defense Attorney: And that violation had to do with him consuming an alcoholic beverage,
isn’t that right, Sir?
Officer: An open container in a public place and public intoxication.
Defense Attorney: Well, Sir, isn’t it true that when you drove your patrol unit by, my client’s
vehicle was legally parked on the side of the road?
Officer: Yes, Sir, it was.
Defense Attorney: There was no portion of my client’s vehicle protruding onto that roadway or
obstructing traffic in any way or form, isn’t that true?
Officer: That’s correct.
Defense Attorney: The only reason that you stopped was because you saw my client inside the
vehicle at that hour, isn’t that true?
Officer: Yes, Sir, at that hour, and because I saw your client duck down as if trying to avoid me
as I drove my marked unit past him.
Defense Attorney: Sir, you retrieved some items from my client’s vehicle, and these are
exhibits in front of you, is that correct?
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Officer: Yes, that is correct.
Defense Attorney: On these three watches, didn’t my client explain to you where he got them
from?
Officer: No, Sir, he never explained.
Defense Attorney: Do you recall him telling you that he won them in a poker game?
Officer: No, Sir, I don’t.
Defense Attorney: Are you sure of that Officer?
Officer: Yes, I am.
Defense Attorney: And these tools, is there anything unusual about these tools? A hammer,
some pliers, screwdrivers… Anything unusual about these tools?
Officer: No, they’re general carpenter’s tools in most circumstances.
Defense Attorney: Well, isn’t it true that many people carry these types of tools in their
vehicles, in their toolbox?
Officer: Yes, Sir, it is.
Defense Attorney: It’s certainly not illegal to carry these tools around is it?
Officer: No, it’s not.
Defense Attorney: And this money that my client had in his possession is there anything
unusual about that paper money?
Officer: No, Sir.
Defense Attorney: In fact, for a person that works and gets paid, it’s not unusual for him to
carry that sum of money is it?
Officer: No, it’s not.
Defense Attorney: It was your testimony that my client was intoxicated?
Officer: Yes, Sir.
Defense Attorney: Isn’t it true that you don’t have any type of testing to determine if he was
intoxicated?
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Officer: I didn’t conduct a test, but in 11 years I have dealt with several intoxicated persons.
Defense Attorney: Okay, Officer, I’m just asking you a very simple question. Did you conduct
a test of intoxication?
Officer: No, Sir, I didn’t conduct a sobriety test.
Defense Attorney: And, Sir, you testified that my client, when you asked him if you could
search his car, he didn’t have any problem with that, did he, Sir?
Officer: No, Sir, he didn’t.
Defense Attorney: In fact, he said “Go on right ahead. I’ve got nothing to hide.” Isn’t that true?
Officer: That’s correct.
Defense Attorney: Did he appear sincere when he told you that?
Officer: Yes.
Defense Attorney: In fact, Mr. Medrano was cooperative and polite with you, isn’t that true?
Officer: Yes.
Defense Attorney: Again, from your personal knowledge, you don’t know who broke into Ms.
Martin’s house, do you?
Officer: No, I don’t.
Defense Attorney: You didn’t see my client do it, did you?
Officer: No, I didn’t see anybody do it.
Defense Attorney: Okay. Thank you, Sir.
(Judge addresses Officer.)
Judge: Alright, thank you, Sir. You’re excused.
(Judge addresses Defense Attorney.)
Judge: You may call your first witness, Counsel.
Defense Attorney: Thank you, Judge. I will call Mark Medrano.
(Judge addresses Mark Medrano.)
Judge: Sir, if you would approach the witness stand.
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(Defense Attorney addresses Mark Medrano.)
Defense Attorney: How are you doing Mr. Medrano?
Mark Medrano: Pretty good.
Defense Attorney: Would you please state your full name for the ladies and gentlemen of this
jury?
Mark Medrano: Yes. Mark Medrano.
Defense Attorney: And where do you live?
Mark Medrano: I live on 100 Glenn Oaks.
Defense Attorney: How long have you lived at 100 Glenn Oaks?
Mark Medrano: About five years.
Defense Attorney: What do you do for a living, Mr. Medrano?
Mark Medrano: I work in construction.
Defense Attorney: And you have been working in construction for how many years?
Mark Medrano: Three.
Defense Attorney: Are you married?
Mark Medrano: No.
Defense Attorney: Mark, I need to take you back to January 10th. Do you remember that day?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Defense Attorney: And why is it that this day is so memorable?
Mark Medrano: I was arrested that day.
Defense Attorney: That’s a pretty memorable event, isn’t it Sir? And going back to that day,
why were you arrested?
Mark Medrano: I don’t know.
Defense Attorney: Mark, have you ever been arrested for anything in your life?
Mark Medrano: No, not prior to that.
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Defense Attorney: Not even a traffic ticket?
Mark Medrano: No.
Defense Attorney: Let’s go back to the day of this arrest. Can you tell the ladies and gentlemen
of this jury where you were at?
Mark Medrano: I was at my girlfriend’s house.
Defense Attorney: What is your girlfriend’s name?
Mark Medrano: It’s Rosa Garcia.
Defense Attorney: Where is her house located?
Mark Medrano: She lives on Skylark
Defense Attorney: What time did you arrive at Rosa’s house?
Mark Medrano: It was around 6 o’clock.
Defense Attorney: How long did you stay there at your girlfriend’s house that evening?
Mark Medrano: Until around10:00 or 10:15.
Defense Attorney: Now, Mark, if you would be kind enough to tell the ladies and gentlemen of
this jury what is it you did there at your girlfriend’s house that evening.
Mark Medrano: We had dinner and watched television for a while.
Defense Attorney: Do you remember what you had for dinner that night?
Mark Medrano: Yes, we had barbeque ribs, potato salad, and corn.
Defense Attorney: Pretty full dinner?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Defense Attorney: After leaving, where did you go?
Mark Medrano: I was on my way home.
Defense Attorney: Were you driving?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
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Defense Attorney: What type of vehicle do you drive?
Mark Medrano: It’s an ‘89 Ford Taurus.
Defense Attorney: What color is it?
Mark Medrano: It’s blue.
Defense Attorney: Did you drive all the way home?
Mark Medrano: No, I was feeling a little tired, so I pulled over to get some rest.
Defense Attorney: Where did you pull over?
Mark Medrano: Just about halfway to my home.
Defense Attorney: What happened then, Mr. Medrano?
Mark Medrano: The police officers arrived, and I was arrested.
Defense Attorney: Why did they arrest you?
Mark Medrano: They didn’t tell me.
Defense Attorney: They didn’t tell you why they were arresting you?
Mark Medrano: No.
Defense Attorney: After they arrested you what happened then?
Mark Medrano: They took me to jail.
Defense Attorney: Mr. Medrano, you know why you’re here this day, don’t you?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Defense Attorney: You know you’re accused of breaking into a lady’s house, Mary Martin’s
house, you know that don’t you?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Defense Attorney: Did you break into that house?
Mark Medrano: No, I didn’t.
Defense Attorney: When they searched this vehicle, were there any items that were retrieved
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from your vehicle?
Mark Medrano: Yes, they pulled out some stuff.
(Defense Attorney addresses Judge.)
Defense Attorney: Judge, may I approach the witness?
Judge: Yes, you may.
(Defense Attorney shows watches to Mark Medrano.)
Defense Attorney: Mr. Medrano, I am now showing you items that have been previously
admitted into evidence. I’m going to ask you, as to this first set of items, do you recognize those?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Defense Attorney: What are they?
Mark Medrano: These are my watches.
Defense Attorney: Were these watches retrieved from your vehicle?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Defense Attorney: The other items; that paper money?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Defense Attorney: Is that your money, Sir?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
(Defense Attorney addresses Judge.)
Defense Attorney: I believe that’s all that I have for Mr. Medrano at this time. Pass the witness.
(Judge addresses Prosecutor.)
Judge: Cross examination.
Prosecutor: Mr. Medrano, I’m going to ask you some questions please let me know if you don’t
understand so I can rephrase them. Is that okay with you?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: You state you’re a construction worker.
Mark Medrano: Yes.
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Prosecutor: Who do you work for?
Mark Medrano: Miller Construction.
Prosecutor: Let me take you back to January 10th. You said that you were visiting your
girlfriend that night.
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: How did you get to your girlfriend’s house?
Mark Medrano: I drove there.
Prosecutor: And you drove in your blue Ford Taurus?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: Is this the same car with a rust spot on the right front side of the car?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: What is the license plate of your car?
Mark Medrano: D-D-Q 3-8-4.
Prosecutor: You state that you had dinner with your girlfriend, am I correct?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: What did you have to drink during dinner?
Mark Medrano: I had a couple of beers.
Prosecutor: A couple of beers?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: Could it have been more?
Mark Medrano: No, it was just two.
Prosecutor: Are you sure?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: What did you all do after dinner?
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Mark Medrano: We watched some TV then.
Prosecutor: Some TV?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: And did you drink then?
Mark Medrano: Yes, I had about three beers then.
Prosecutor: Are you sure it was just three?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: Could it have been more?
Mark Medrano: No.
Prosecutor: And then you stated that you left at 10:00-10:15, am I right?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: How do you know that was the time?
Mark Medrano: It was the same time that the show ended.
Prosecutor: What show are you talking about?
Mark Medrano: Some Sylvester Stallone movie.
Prosecutor: Do you know which one?
Mark Medrano: I can’t recall.
Prosecutor: Okay. You left at 10:15, got in your car and started driving home, am I correct?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: And you pulled over, right?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: Do you know exactly where you pulled over?
Mark Medrano: I don’t remember the name of the street.
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Prosecutor: You don’t remember the name of the street? This is a route that you take often, am
I correct?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: To travel between you and your girlfriend’s house, am I right?
Mark Medrano: Yes, that’s correct
Prosecutor: But you don’t remember the name of the street.
Mark Medrano: No.
Prosecutor: And you stated that you didn’t even remember how long you were there before the
police showed up, am I correct?
Mark Medrano: Yeah, I was trying to get some sleep.
Prosecutor: And the next thing you know a police officer was arresting you, am I correct?
Mark Medrano: Yes, that’s correct.
Prosecutor: And you remember the facts correctly, am I correct?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: But you had at least five beers that night, am I right?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: And isn’t it true that they even found an empty can in your car?
Mark Medrano: Yes, that’s correct.
Prosecutor: Would you say that you were intoxicated that night?
Mark Medrano: I was feeling a little tipsy, but not intoxicated.
Prosecutor: You weren’t intoxicated, but you had five beers and drove?
Mark Medrano: That is correct.
Prosecutor: Sir, do you recognize those three watches in front of you?
Mark Medrano: Yes, they’re mine.
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Prosecutor: Those are the three watches that the officer retrieved from your car?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: How is it that you got to have three watches in your possession?
Mark Medrano: I won them in a poker game the day before.
Prosecutor: The day before?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: Whom were you in that poker game with?
Mark Medrano: Some people from work.
Prosecutor: And you won those watches as part of a bet?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: From whom specifically did you win those watches from?
Mark Medrano: It was just some people there at the game.
Prosecutor: So you don’t know exactly who?
Mark Medrano: I’m not sure about their names.
Prosecutor: Okay. Do you see the money right next to you?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: That is 270 dollars. Am I correct?
(Mark Medrano counts money.)
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: That’s the money that you had on you when the police arrested you?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: How is it that you were in possession of so much money that night?
Mark Medrano: That was from my paycheck from the week before.
Prosecutor: From the week before. When was it that you got paid?
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Mark Medrano: It was the Friday before that.
Prosecutor: Did you get paid 270 dollars?
Mark Medrano: No, I was paid 300 dollars.
Prosecutor: What did you use 30 dollars for?
Mark Medrano: I just bought some food and stuff like that.
Prosecutor: Did you use any of that money for the gambling?
Mark Medrano: No.
(Defense Attorney objects. Defense Attorney addresses Judge.)
Defense Attorney: I’m going to object to the counsel’s repeated questions about gambling. My
client is not on trial for any gambling here and obviously this is an attempt by the prosecutor to
try to inflame the passions of this jury.
Judge: The objection is overruled. You may proceed, Counsel.
(Prosecutor addresses Mark Medrano.)
Prosecutor: Did you or did you not use any of that money when you gambled?
Mark Medrano: No, I didn’t use this money.
Prosecutor: None at all?
Mark Medrano: No.
Prosecutor: So, is it that you and your friends, then, just use watches to gamble with?
(Defense Attorney objects. Defense Attorney addresses Judge.)
Defense Attorney: Again, this is badgering the witness. I’m going object on basis that this
question has been asked and answered. It is repetitive, not relevant, and it’s badgering of my
client.
(Judge addresses Mark Medrano.)
Judge: Overruled. You may proceed, Counsel.
(Mark Medrano responds.)
Mark Medrano: Yes, that’s correct.
(Prosecutor addresses Judge.)
Prosecutor: Your Honor, may I approach the witness?
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Judge: Yes you may.
(Prosecutor addresses Mark Medrano.)
Prosecutor: These are tools that were admitted into evidence earlier today. Would you take a
good look at those?
Mark Medrano: Yes, these are my tools.
Prosecutor: Were those in your car the night you were arrested?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: Why do you carry so many tools around?
Mark Medrano: Just in case my car breaks down so I can work on it.
Prosecutor: So, those tools are for fixing your car?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: Those aren’t tools from work?
Mark Medrano: No.
Prosecutor: You wouldn’t take tools from work, would you?
Mark Medrano: No, I wouldn’t.
Prosecutor: Take a look at that. Is that a hammer?
Mark Medrano: Yes, yes it is.
Prosecutor: Can you pick that up?
(Mark Medrano picks up hammer.)
Prosecutor: How is it that you use that to fix your car?
Mark Medrano: Sometimes I have to hit the battery to get it going.
Prosecutor: Alright. Do you see that green tool, right in front of you?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: Now, that’s a gardening tool, isn’t that correct?
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Mark Medrano: Yes, I believe so.
Prosecutor: How is it that you use that to fix your car?
Mark Medrano: Well, sometimes I have to poke around in there, in the engine a little, so I use
this one.
Prosecutor: You told the ladies and gentlemen of this jury that you’ve never been arrested, is
this correct?
Mark Medrano: Yes.
Prosecutor: But isn’t it true then that on this particular weekend you were arrested because you
had been drinking at least five beers and had been driving and had an empty can in your car?
Wouldn’t it be safe to say you were driving while intoxicated?
(Defense Attorney objects. Defense Attorney addresses Judge.)
Defense Attorney: Excuse me Judge, again, I’m going to object. My client has not been
charged with driving while intoxicated. Again, this is a direct attempt by the State to prejudice
this jury. I’m going to object on basis that any probative value is far overweighed by the
prejudicial effects of this type of question Judge.
(Judge addresses Prosecutor)
Judge: Objection is overruled, you may proceed, Counsel.
(Prosecutor addresses Mark Medrano.)
Prosecutor: Isn’t it also true that on this particular weekend, the day before, you were actually
out gambling, am I correct?
Mark Medrano: Yes, that is correct.
Prosecutor: Thank you. No further questions by the State.
(Judge addresses Mark Medrano.)
Judge: Thank you, Sir. You may take your seat at the counsel table.
(Judge addresses Jury.)
Judge: Ladies and gentlemen, I will read the charge to you at this time. After the attorneys have
presented their summations, you will go to the jury room. You will then select one of your
members, either male or female, as foreperson. It shall be your foreperson’s duty: to preside
over your discussions and deliberations upon your case; to vote with you; and, when you
unanimously agree upon a verdict, to certify it is your verdict by signing his name as foreperson.
You will have this charge with you in the jury room and you shall refer to it for guidance during
your deliberations.
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Your sole duty at this time is to determine the guilt or non-guilt of the defendant under the
indictment in this cause and restrict your deliberations solely to the issue of whether the
defendant is guilty or not guilty. After you have arrived at your verdict, you will notify the bailiff
that you have reached your verdict. You are the exclusive judges of the facts proved, the
credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony, but you are bound to
receive the law as is given to you in this charge, and you are bound to be governed thereby. You
shall consider only the evidence and exhibits presented here in the courtroom to the witnesses
who have testified.
In deliberating on this case, you shall not talk to anyone except the members of the jury about it
until you have been finally discharged from service on this jury. You are instructed that the
grand jury indictment is not evidence of guilt. It is a means whereby the defendant is brought to
trial in a felony prosecution. It is not evidence, nor can it be considered by you, in passing upon
the non-guilt or guilt of the defendant. All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person
may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. The fact that a person has been arrested, confined, or indicted for, or otherwise charged
for the offense gives rise to no inference of guilt at the trial.
The law does not require the defendant to prove his innocence or to produce any evidence at all.
The presumption that innocence alone is sufficient to acquit the defendant, unless the jurors are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant’s guilt after a careful and impartial
consideration of all the evidence in this case. The prosecution has the burden of proving the
defendant guilty and it must do so by each and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant. It is not required for the prosecution
to prove guilt beyond all possible doubt, it is required that the prosecution’s proof excludes all
reasonable doubt concerning the defendant’s guilt.
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, common sense, after careful and impartial
consideration of all the evidence in the case. It’s the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable
person hesitate to act in the most important of his or her own affairs. Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt therefore must be proof such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and
act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your affairs. In the event that you have a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt after considering all the evidence before you and
these instructions you will acquit him and say by your verdict not guilty.
The defendant, Marco Antonio Medrano, stands charged by indictment with the offense of
burglary, alleged to have been committed on or about the 10th day of January. The defendant has
pled not guilty.
Our law provides that a person commits the offense of burglary if:
1) Without the effective consent of the owner he enters a habitation with the intent to commit
theft; or
2) Without the effective consent of the owner he enters a habitation, and commits theft or
attempts to commit theft.
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Now, if you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that on or about the 10th day of
January, the defendant, Marco Antonio Medrano did:
1) Enter a habitation owned by Mary Martin, without the effective consent of said owner with
the intent to commit the offense of theft; or
2) Enter a habitation owned by Mary Martin, without the effective consent of said owner and
then and there commit or attempt to commit the offense of theft,
then you will find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment. That is Verdict Form A.
Unless you so find beyond a reasonable doubt or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will
find the defendant not guilty. That is Verdict Form B.
Concerning the manner of deliberations, you are instructed as follows: in order to return a
verdict each juror must agree to it. Jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to
deliberate toward reaching an agreement, if a verdict can be reached without aggravating
individual judgment. Each juror must decide the case for themselves, but only after an impartial
consideration of the evidence with fellow jurors. In the course of the deliberations the juror
should not hesitate to reexamine his or her own views and change that opinion if convinced it is
erroneous. No juror should surrender his or her honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the
evidence solely because of the opinion of other jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a
verdict. You shall not reach a verdict by lot, or by chance, or by any other method except by a
fair and impartial deliberation of the law and the evidence. Do not let bias, prejudice, or
sympathy play any part in your deliberations.
I have signed the original charge. At this time we will proceed with the arguments, with the
defendant’s first, and the State’s following. You may proceed with the arguments at this time.
Defense Attorney: May it please the Court, Mr. Arredondo, Mr. Medrano, and ladies and
gentlemen of the jury. This has been a rather short trial. There haven’t been that many witnesses,
and I entrust their testimony to your memory. I thank you for having listened and for having been
as attentive as you’ve been. Mr. Medrano and I both thank you from the bottom of our hearts.
This is a very, very important day in the life of this young man. Back during the first day, when
you were out there in the panel and we were picking the panel, you promised one thing, and that
is that you would follow the law. And that you would hold the state of Texas to its burden. And
that burden is the highest burden in our system of jurisprudence. It’s beyond a reasonable doubt.
And why is this the highest burden? People, it’s because we’re talking about liberty, we’re
talking about a person’s freedom and we want to make sure, we want to be positive before we
take that away from any person in this free country of ours.
Here I submit to you that this case is complete with reasonable doubt. It’s everywhere, in every
one of the witnesses that the State produced. Remember the definition of reasonable doubt: it is
the kind of doubt that if a person would have this kind of doubt in making the most crucial
decisions in his or her life—that’s the decision to get married, the decision to have that triple
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bypass; if there is any doubt; any doubt, in this type of decision, then people, that is the kind of
doubt that reasonable doubt is here. And I submit to you that this case has it.
The question for you today is, do you believe that that doubt exists here? And again if we look at
the State’s witnesses, let’s look at what they’re telling us. And I think that the answer becomes
readily apparent.
Mary Martin, that’s the homeowner, she’s telling you: “Well, yeah, I recognize a blue car. And
yeah, it looked like a man was driving the car, it looked like a man was inside.” She doesn’t even
know if this was a woman. She can’t tell you anything about the facial features of this man or
this person. She doesn’t know who was driving the car, pure and simple. But hey, this person had
a bunch of tools on him, he had screwdrivers, some pliers, he had to be a burglar. Well, people,
use your common sense. Use your common sense. I know many, many people that have many
articles like these in their respective toolboxes, and guess what? Those toolboxes are in their
cars.
She never identifies her husband’s watch. This is a lady that has been married for years. This is a
lady that has had every opportunity in the world to go back and look at that watch and I submit to
you that she knows this watch. She knows its particulars; she knows how this watch looks. And
she told you on that Mary Martin stand: “I can’t positively identify it. I can’t tell you for certain
that this is my husband’s.” Is that reasonable doubt? Are these tools reasonable doubt?
No one places my client at that address, nobody sees my client near that home. Is that reasonable
doubt? Can anyone identify my client as being inside that vehicle? And absolutely no one, no
one sees my client near the house.
The State’s case is based on nothing but assumptions and innuendos. And because my client had
some cash on him and some watches; and he explained where he got those watches, and some
tools, they want you to strip him of his liberty. They want you to label him a felon; they want
you to convict him. That’s the evidence that the State has, and based on that they want you to
strip Mr. Medrano of his fundamental rights, and of the freedoms that he enjoys.
Let’s look at Mr. Medrano. What do we know about him? Well, we know that he has no prior
criminal history, not even a traffic ticket. Never, never had he been arrested for anything. And
this is a man that they want you to label a burglar, this is a man that they want to strip of his
freedoms.
I ask you, and I implore you, to do the right thing here, to do the only thing that you can do under
the evidence and under the facts presented. And that is to find Mr. Medrano not guilty. Thank
you.
Prosecutor: May it please the Court, Mr. Carrasco, Mr. Medrano, ladies and gentlemen of the
jury, you have now heard all the evidence in this case. At this point at time, all we’re going to do
is argue this case. All the evidence has already been presented to you, so nothing that I state or
that the defense attorney is going to state is actual evidence; all we’re doing is giving you
interpretations of the evidence.
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You’ve heard the judge read the charge to you, and I want you to pay particular attention to the
burden of proof. Burden of proof does not state that the state has to prove beyond all reasonable
doubt, beyond all doubt, that the defendant was the one who committed this crime. The State has
to prove this beyond any reasonable doubt.
What am I saying? There can be a doubt, the question is, is it reasonable or not? Use your
common knowledge and look at the facts, look at the evidence presented, and if there are any
doubts ask yourself that question: Is that reasonable or not? Ladies and gentlemen, what we
have is Mary Martin, who is coming home, 8:45 in the evening, walking to her door, she sees the
blue car leaving her home, she walks in the door, the door has been jimmied, she goes into her
house, the house has been ransacked, the drawers are pulled out, boxes are open, 252 dollars in
cash is missing and a gold watch is missing. We don’t have an identification of the defendant by
Ms. Martin saying: “Yes, that’s the guy, Mr. Medrano, I saw at my house.” We don’t have that in
this case. But before you go back there and say: “I guess there’s not enough evidence” ask
yourselves a very important question: Who controlled the crime? Was it Ms. Martin? Was Ms.
Martin the one that said: “You know what? Let’s have a burglary at my house. And when I get
home I’m going to see the guy face to face and then he’s going to get away and then I’m going to
be able to identify him.” Do we have that? No.
Who’s the person that controlled this crime? It was Mr. Medrano. If you’re Mr. Medrano, what
are you going to do? Are you going to say: “I’m going to commit a crime here and present an
opportunity for an eyewitness to see me and point me out in front of a jury”? No. That’s not what
we have here. So although we have a situation where there is no positive identification by Ms.
Martin as to who was in her house, remember, who was the one who controlled the situation?
Another important piece of evidence: the watch, the gold watch. There’s a watch that was found
on Mr. Medrano’s possession by Officer Bolick. Now, you heard testimony from Ms. Martin.
She saw the watch, she can’t say with 100% certainty that that is the watch. Now why is that?
Don’t hold her to a higher bit of accountability than you would anybody else, including
yourselves. This lady had not seen this watch on a daily basis. She didn’t sit there and put it on
every day. She didn’t pull it out of the drawer, opened the box, and look inside at it every single
day. She didn’t do that. Her husband had died five years before, and it was in a box and it was in
a drawer and she hadn’t seen that watch in five years.
Now, Ms. Martin could’ve come up here and said: “You know, that is the watch; I’m a 100%
sure.” But no, she was being honest with you, ladies and gentlemen. She was being honest in
telling you what she really thought. She said: “That’s very similar to the one my husband had.”
And that’s the situation we have here.
What else do we have? We have a defendant that is found six blocks away, in an intoxicated
state, with a mess full of tools. That’s a little strange, ladies and gentlemen.
What the State is asking is not the impossible. The only thing the State is asking you to do is to
make reasonable conclusions from the facts presented. And when you do that, the State is certain
that you’re going to find that the State met its burden of proof. Remember, use your common
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sense when you go back there, put the pieces of the puzzle together. This isn’t a situation where
it’s all presented right in front of you, where you’re the eyewitness, and the camera’s right there,
and you can see the whole thing, it’s all videotaped for you. That’s not the situation.
Remember, the defendant was the one who controlled this crime. That’s the reason why there’s
bits and pieces and why you need to go back there, study all the evidence very carefully, and
look at it. The State is confident when you do that, that you can agree that the State has met its
burden of proof beyond all reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of burglary of a
habitation. Thank you very much.
(Judge addresses Jury.)
Judge: Arguments having concluded, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we will send you back to
the jury room for your deliberations. We wish you well in your deliberations. When you have
concluded your deliberations and have reached a verdict, please advise the bailiff. Thank you.
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APPENDIX D
Individual Verdict Form

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF EL PASO, TEXAS
THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
VERDICT FORM

I find the defendant GUILTY of burglary.

I find the defendant NOT GUILTY of burglary.

Rate your confidence that you selected that correct verdict decision.
Very Unsure

Unsure

Neutral

Confident

Very Confident

1

2

3

4

5

Please explain your confidence rating:

Continue ONLY if you checked GUILTY.
If you found the defendant GUILTY, for how many years would you sentence the defendant?
The sentencing guideline in the State of Texas for this offense of Second Degree Felony burglary
is no more than 20 years and no less than 2 years. In addition, the defendant, if charged, may be
punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000.

My sentence is:

Years and $

Fine (optional)
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APPENDIX E
Post Verdict Questionnaire
Without looking back at the trial transcript, please list from memory all relevant facts in evidence
on a separate line in the first column. You do not have to use all the lines.
Evidence

Weight

Rank Order

Pro-Prosecution or Defense

On the second column, please weight each fact in evidence in terms of the degree to which it
influenced your decision. Assign a percentage to each fact such that the total equals 100%. You
do not have to assign a percentage to each fact. You may assign 0% to facts that were not
influential in your decision making.
On the third column, please rank order each fact in order of importance to you in making your
personal verdict decision with 1 being the most important, 2, being next important, and so on.
On the last column, please indicate whether you personally feel that piece of evidence supports
the prosecution’s case (guilty) or the defense’s case (not guilty), regardless of your personal
verdict preference.
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Considering all the evidence discussed in the trial, please indicate how strong you believe the
evidence to be against the defendant. When evaluating strength of evidence, think about how
guilty the evidence made the defendant look.
Very Weak Against
Defendant
1

Weak

Neutral

Strong

2

3

4

Very Strong Against the
Defendant
5

4

Very Unlikable
5

Using the scale provided, please rate the trial participants:
Prosecuting Attorney:
Very Likable
1

2

Neutral
3

Very Persuasive
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Very Unlikable
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Very Unlikable
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

Very Likable
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Very Unlikable
5

Very Persuasive
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

Very Likable
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Very Unlikable
5

Very Persuasive
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

Defense Attorney:
Very Likable
1
Very Persuasive
1
Judge:
Very Likable
1
Very Persuasive
1
Ms. Mary Martin:

Mr. Mark Medrano:
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Police Officer:
Very Likable
1
Very Persuasive
1

2

Neutral
3

2

Neutral
3
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4

Very Unlikable
5

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

APPENDIX F
Group Deliberation Form
Please indicate your group’s verdict.
We find the defendant GUILTY of burglary.

We find the defendant NOT GUILTY of burglary.
Answer this item ONLY if you checked GUILTY.
If you found the defendant GUILTY, for how many years would you sentence the defendant?
The sentencing guideline in the State of Texas for this offense of Second Degree Felony burglary
is no more than 20 years and no less than 2 years. In addition, the defendant, if charged, may be
punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000.

Sentence:

Years and $

Fine (optional)

Considering all the evidence discussed in the trial, as a group, please indicate how strong you
believe the evidence to be against the defendant. When evaluating strength of evidence, think
about how guilty the evidence made the defendant look.
Very Weak Against
Defendant
1

Weak

Neutral

Strong

2

3

4

Very Strong Against the
Defendant
5

Indicate which facts in evidence that your group discussed in reaching your group decision. For
each fact in evidence listed, please make a check mark in the “discussed?” column to indicate
that your group discussed that fact.
Fact in Evidence
Mr. Medrano claims he was with his girlfriend on the evening in question
Ms. Martin reported that the car was a four door Sedan
Mr. Medrano gave permission to search the car
Mr. Medrano’s license plate is D-D-Q 384
Mr. Medrano had garden tools in his trunk
Mr. Medrano was paid $300 two days before the burglary
Ms. Martin could not say if the person she saw was a man or a woman
Mr. Medrano provided the officer with the keys to search his vehicle
Ms. Martin was 20-25 feet away when she saw the car
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Discussed?

Mr. Medrano claimed he left his girlfriend’s home at 10-10:30pm
The Bulova watch stolen was not engraved
$252 stolen from Ms. Martin
Mr. Medrano was parked legally on the side of the road
8:55pm police arrived at Ms. Martin’s home
9:40pm Officer Bolick arrests Mr. Medrano
Ms. Martin identified the watch as being similar to her husband’s watch
Ms. Martin’s drive is well lit
Gold Bulova watch stolen from Ms. Martin
Mr. Medrano arrived at girlfriend’s home at 6pm
One watch in Mr. Medrano’s possession was a gold Bulova
Mr. Medrano works in construction
Mr. Medrano pulled over on side of the road because he was tired
Ms. Martin saw someone in driveway
Ms. Martin’s home had been locked
Ms. Martin’s husband had been dead for 5 years
Officer Bolick did not conduct a sobriety test
The burglary took place on Jan 10
The gold Bulova watch belonged to Ms. Martin’s husband
Mr. Medrano was arrested on Jan 10
Mr. Medrano drives an 89 Ford Taurus
Mr. Medrano was in a blue car
Mr. Medrano did not explain to the arresting officer where he obtained the
three watches
Mr. Medrano did not know his co-workers names from whom he won the
watches
Mr. Medrano ducked when the officer drove by
Mr. Medrano had $270 in his pocket
Ms. Martin could not verify that the watch was her husband’s
Mr. Medrano was in possession of 3 watches
Mr. Medrano was reported to be drunk
Break in 8:45pm
Door was jimmied open
Ms. Martin reported seeing a blue car
Mr. Medrano claims he won the 3 watches in a poker game
Ms. Martin reported the license plate was D-D-X or C
Ms. Martin reported that the car had a gray smudge
The police arrived 20 minutes after the burglary
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Please list the all relevant facts in evidence you discussed (as indicated in the table above) on a
separate line in the first column. You do not have to use all the lines.
Evidence

Weight

Rank Order

Pro-Prosecution or Defense

On the second column, please weight each fact in evidence in terms of the degree to which it
influenced your decision. Assign a percentage to each fact such that the total equals 100%. You
do not have to assign a percentage to each fact. You may assign 0% to facts that were not
influential in your decision making.
On the third column, please rank order each fact in order of importance to you in making your
personal verdict decision with 1 being the most important, 2, being next important, and so on.
On the last column, please indicate whether your group determined that piece of evidence
supports the prosecution’s case (guilty) or the defense’s case (not guilty), regardless of your final
group verdict.
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Using the scale provided, please rate the trial participants:
Prosecuting Attorney:
Very Likable
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Very Unlikable
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

Very Likable
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Very Unlikable
5

Very Persuasive
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

Very Likable
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Very Unlikable
5

Very Persuasive
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Very Unlikable
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Very Unlikable
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

Very Likable
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Very Unlikable
5

Very Persuasive
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

Very Persuasive
1
Defense Attorney:

Judge:

Ms. Mary Martin:
Very Likable
1
Very Persuasive
1
Mr. Mark Medrano:
Very Likable
1
Very Persuasive
1
Police Officer:
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APPENDIX G
Post Deliberation Questionnaire
What was your group’s verdict?

GUILTY of burglary.

NOT GUILTY of burglary.

Rate your confidence that your group selected that correct verdict decision.
Very Unsure

Unsure

Neutral

Confident

Very Confident

1

2

3

4

5

Please explain your confidence rating:

Do you personally believe that your group reached the correct verdict decision?
YES

NO
Please explain your answer:

Does the group’s verdict decision differ from your initial verdict decision (before deliberation)?
YES

NO

144

If YES, what persuaded you to change your decision?
Check all that apply:
I changed to the majority decision.
Other group members brought up evidence that I did not recall.
Other group members helped me to rethink the evidence.
I felt coerced by other group members to change my verdict.
Other: Please include any other reason in the space provided below.

At what point during the group deliberation did you decide to change your verdict?
Check all that apply:
I changed my decision prior to the group deliberation.
I changed my decision after hearing the verdict preferences of the other group members.
I changed my decision after discussing the evidence with the other group members.
I changed my decision toward after I felt coerced by other group members.
Other: Please include any additional information in the space provided below.

Group Decision Process
How would you describe the process that led to your group decision?

What evidence influenced your group’s decision?

How influential were you in the group decision?
Very Influential
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Influential
5

How motivated were you to persuade other group members to see things from your point of
view?
Very Motivated
1

2

Neutral
3
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4

Not at all Motivated
5

Perceptions of Other Group Members

The picture represents the table at which you deliberated with your group. We are interested in
your perceptions of each of the other group members. Please indicate where you sat with an “X”.
Using your group member’s numbers, please indicate your responses to the following questions.
Be sure to write the number of the group member you rate in the space provided.
Juror #
How similar is this person to you?
Extremely Similar
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Similar
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Likeable
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

How likeable?
Extremely Likeable
1
How persuasive?
Extremely Persuasive
1
How knowledgeable?
Extremely
Knowledgeable
1

Neutral
2

3

Not at all Knowledgeable
4
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Juror #
How similar is this person to you?
Extremely Similar
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Similar
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Likeable
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

How likeable?
Extremely Likeable
1
How persuasive?
Extremely Persuasive
1
How knowledgeable?
Extremely
Knowledgeable
1

Neutral
2

Not at all Knowledgeable

3

4

5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Similar
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Likeable
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

Juror #
How similar is this person to you?
Extremely Similar
1
How likeable?
Extremely Likeable
1
How persuasive?
Extremely Persuasive
1
How knowledgeable?
Extremely
Knowledgeable
1

Neutral
2

3

Not at all Knowledgeable
4
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Juror #
How similar is this person to you?
Extremely Similar
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Similar
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Likeable
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

How likeable?
Extremely Likeable
1
How persuasive?
Extremely Persuasive
1
How knowledgeable?
Extremely
Knowledgeable
1
Juror #

Neutral
2

3

Not at all Knowledgeable
4

5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Similar
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Likeable
5

2

Neutral
3

4

Not at all Persuasive
5

How similar is this person to you?
Extremely Similar
1
How likeable?
Extremely Likeable
1
How persuasive?
Extremely Persuasive
1
How knowledgeable?
Extremely
Knowledgeable
1

Neutral
2

3

Not at all Knowledgeable
4
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APPENDIX H
Description of Modified Word Count Coding Procedure
Deliberation transcripts were coded for individual juror-level participation using a
variation of the modified word count procedure described by Dickinson and Poole (2000). First,
all 37 deliberation transcripts were combined into a single file using a macro written in Microsoft
Word:

Sub MergeDocs()
Dim rng As Range
Dim MainDoc As Document
Dim strFile As String
Const strFolder = “C:\Users\Usman Javaid\Desktop\Word documents\”
Set MainDoc = Documents.Add
strFile = Dir$(strFolder & “*.docx”)
Do Until strFile = “”
Set rng = MainDoc.Range
rng.Collapse wdCollapseEnd
rng.InsertFile strFolder & strFile
strFile = Dir$()
Loop
End Sub
The file including all transcriptions was then modified using the advanced find and
replace function in Microsoft Word. Words were not deleted, but were replaced as hidden text,
and hidden text was not included in any word count calculations.
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The coding was completed in five steps. First, all contractions were replaced with the full
text (e.g., “I’ve” was replaced with “I have”). This step was completed for consistency in word
count. Individuals who said “haven’t” provided as much meaningful information as individuals
who said “have not”; however, using raw word count procedures, “haven’t” would count as one
word, and “have not” would count as two words. Second, all hedges and hesitations were
removed. For the current study, the removed hedges included: “uh,” “so,” “um,” “just,” “you
know,” “like,” “kind of,” “kinda,” “sort of,” “sorta,” “or something,” “yeah,” “or whatever,”
“oh,” “okay,” “well,” and “I mean.” Third, all false starts and repeated phrases were removed.
The coder read over the text of the transcript and identified repetitive words and phrases for
removal (e.g., “He, uh, he said that” or “I don’t know if, well, I don’t know if I agree”). Fourth,
all conjunctions (e.g., “and,” “or,” “although”) were removed. Finally, all articles (e.g., “a,”
“an,” “the”) were removed. The coder reviewed the transcriptions to ensure that the hidden text
procedure was executed correctly.
Next, the text of each transcription was copied into a separate sheet in Microsoft Excel. A
series of formulae were used to calculate the total number of words spoken (excluding hidden
text) during the deliberation, the number of turns during the deliberation, and the average number
of words spoken during each turn. Using a formula, a word count was completed for each turn in
the deliberation:
=IF(LEN(TRIM(D2))=0,0,LEN(TRIM(D2))-LEN(SUBSTITUTE(D2," ",""))+1)
This word count excluded all hidden text. Next, all the turns for each juror in the deliberation
were combined to provide a modified word count for each individual participant in the
deliberation. For example:
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=DSUM(Juries!$A$1:$J$8131,"MWC",Time!HD$1:HD$2)
The average number of words spoken during each turn was calculated by dividing the
total number of words spoken (excluding hidden words) divided by the number of turns. For
example:
=DAVERAGE(Juries!$A$1:$J$8131,"MWC",Time!HD$1:HD$2)
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